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ABSTRACT 
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to make a contribution to the literature on buyer 
seller relationships by looking at the relationship between smallholder cocoa growers 
(suppliers) and the License buying companies (buyers). The study reports on the factors 
that influence perceived buyer opportunism such as: relationship duration, buyer control, 
supplier satisfaction, trust, the relative power of the buyer over the supplier and 
transaction-specific supplier development efforts undertaken by the buyer in the supplier. 
Design/method/approach – Literature on transaction cost theory and relational 
contracting theory are reviewed. This leads to the formulation of the research model and 
the hypotheses in order to test the proposed association between buyer opportunism and 
buyer control; supplier satisfaction; transaction-specific supplier development and the 
interaction between relationship duration and supplier satisfaction. Data from a survey of 
seventy three (73) small holder cocoa farmers of Ghana was used. 
Findings – The empirical findings shows that buyer control has a significant positive 
association with buyer opportunism. Supplier satisfaction and transaction-specific supplier 
development have a significant negative association with buyer opportunism. The findings 
also indicate that under conditions of high supplier satisfaction, there is a stronger negative 
association between relationship duration and buyer opportunism than under conditions of 
low/moderate supplier satisfaction. 
Limitation of the study – A major limitation of the study has to do with the sample size. 
The sample size of seventy three (73) does not meet the recommended sample size.  
Secondly, the study involved the analysis of one industry and hence findings cannot be 
generalized even though the study makes interesting findings regarding the contingent 
effect of supplier satisfaction on the association between relationship duration and buyer 
opportunism. 
Managerial implication –Buyer opportunism is a very important issue that should be 
taken note of in business relationships. This is because perceive buyer opportunism 
reduces trust and supplier satisfaction. In order for management to overcome this issue 
they need to identify the key factors that influence buyer opportunism and put in place 
measures for the monitoring of agents who represents these buying firms in order to ensure 
a satisfactory buyer-supplier relationships.  In conclusion, for long-term business 
relationships to be perceived by either party as less opportunistic there is the need for both 
parties to ensure satisfactory relationship outcomes for mutual benefit.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Buyer seller relationships have been in existence since man started trading in goods 
and services and has developed over time based on trust, friendship and quality goods and 
services (Wilson, 1995). The production of cocoa for export involves relationships 
between cocoa growers and buying agents representing Licensed Buying Companies 
(LBCs) which are firms authorized under the laws of Ghana to partake in the internal 
purchase and marketing of cocoa within the Ghanaian economy. Thus the relationship 
between buying firms and the cocoa growers is a typical buyer-seller relationship as it 
involves interactions between two parties over a period of time.  
However, there seems to be growing dissatisfaction in the relationship existing 
between suppliers of this all important crop and buying firms due to perceived buyer 
opportunism. Recent reports of resentment by farmers give credence to this perception 
(Business and Financial Times, 2012b; Opoku, 2011). It is therefore the aim of this study 
to find out the key factors that influence buyer opportunism and also to elucidate on the 
key issues that can be taken into consideration for policy and management practice 
especially within the cocoa sector of Ghana. The second purpose is to contribute to theory 
as most studies on opportunism has been done from the perspective of buyers. This study 
takes a different approach by integrating transaction cost and relational contract theory and 
using the relationship between a buyer and supplier as the unit of analysis. 
1.2 Background of the Study 
From 1947 until 1993 the state was the only buyer of cocoa through the Ghana 
Cocoa Board (known as COCOBOD). As part of the World Bank Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) the sector was liberalized and farmers could now sell to 25 private 
licensed buying companies (LBC’s) or to the Produced Buying Company (PBC) a former 
subsidiary of the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD). Farmers make the choice of which 
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LBCs to sell to depending on prompt payment and the degree of trust that the farmer has in 
the LBCs agent so they try to avoid the less trustworthy ones (Vigneri and Santos, 2007). 
The granting of loan, input on credit and the subsidizing of input also play an important 
role in the choice of which buyer to sell to. 
  Recent reports of resentment by farmers through perceived opportunism in the 
form of cheating by the purchasing agents has been a major source of dissatisfaction and 
worry. It was reported on Dec.29, 2011 in the Daily Guide newspaper that a section of the 
cocoa farmers in the Jomoro District of the Western Region were angry due to the 
perceived cheating in weighing of cocoa by purchasing clerks. The angry cocoa farmers 
claim they notice the disparity in the weights after they have weighed their beans from the 
house. This they believe is done through the manipulation of the scales by the clerks. They 
threaten to smuggle their product to Ivory Coast if the practice is not curtailed (Opoku, 
2011). Findings from a survey involving 14 communities within the Ashanti, western and 
central regions of Ghana shows that the deliberate adjustment of weighing scale to favor 
the buyers was widespread in these communities (Business and Financial Times, 2012b). 
In a related report it was reported that the industry regulatory the Ghana Cocoa Board 
(COCOBOD) threatens to sanction LBCs found guilty of adjusting their weighing scale in 
order to cheat farmers (Business and Financial Times, 2012b).This tells the scale of this 
practice and how wide spread it is.  
Buyer control in terms of quality control is exercised by the industry regulator called 
Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) through the various Licensed Buying Companies 
(LBCs) that are authorized to be involved in the internal marketing and purchasing of 
cocoa from the farmers. In a recent report titled “Performance Evaluation of Licensed 
Buying Companies - 2010/11 Main Crop Season”, COCOBOD, revoked the license of 
four buying companies. Under the internal marketing of cocoa regulations in Ghana, LBCs 
are required to purchase a minimum of 2,000 tons of cocoa; failure by an LBC to meet the 
requirement after three seasons mandates the industry regulator, Ghana Cocoa Board 
(COCOBOD) to withdraw its license (Business and Financial Times, 2012a). The inability 
of these LBCs to meet this requirement may be due to the fact that the cocoa growers in 
their vicinity are dissatisfied with them thus their refusal to sell to them. 
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1.3 Research problem 
This work is concerned with the study of buyer opportunism which is characterized by 
behaviors as lying, insincerity and the undervaluation of products by buying companies in 
the purchase of cocoa in Ghana. These behaviors are a reflection of opportunistic behavior 
as noted by (John, 1984; Williamson, 1985). Some examples of opportunistic behavior 
documented includes such behaviors as withholding or distorting information, lies, 
stealing, cheating, calculated efforts to mislead, disguise, confuse, and shirking or failing 
to fulfill promises or obligations (John, 1984; Williamson, 1985). Thus the study seeks to 
find reasons that lead to the exercise of such behavior by buying firms and the effect of 
their actions on the buyer supplier relationship. Shueh-Chin Ting et al (2007) noted that 
due to bounded rationality the display of opportunistic behavior is present in exchange 
relationships as partners seek their own interest thus opportunism is seen as an aspect of 
human behavior.  
However opportunism in business to business relationships is said to be shaped by the 
partner’s perception, it can be either real or perceived (Rindfleisch et al, 2010). Previous 
studies have shown the negative effect of opportunism on relational exchange norms such 
as trust, cooperation and on satisfaction (Batt, 2003; Joshi and Stump 1999; Morgan and 
Hunt, 1994; Sabel, 1993).  Also the tendency for buyers to behave opportunistically is 
expected to reduce when relationship duration increases so why would buyers behave 
opportunistically when it is detrimental to the relationship? Thus, in view of the issues 
discussed this present study is undertaken to seek answers to the question: 
 What key factors influence buyer opportunism as perceived by suppliers? 
 Under what condition does supplier’s prior relationship with an exchange partner 
reduces buyer opportunism? 
1.4 Justification of the study 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the perceived opportunism exhibited by 
buyers of cocoa. The study seeks to identify the key influencing factors of perceived buyer 
opportunism from the perspective of suppliers of cocoa in the buyer seller relationship. We 
rely on Transaction Cost Theory and Relational Contracting Theory as the main theoretical 
frameworks to help find answers to our research question in the study of this phenomenon.  
 4 
Since it has been noted that research that investigate opportunism basically relies on 
transaction cost analysis and/or relational exchange theory (Lai et al. 2005; cited in 
Hawkins, 2007). We seek to integrate transaction cost and relational contract theory to 
better help explain the phenomenon understudy.  
The key dimensions of transaction cost integrated with the relational propositions 
of relational contract theory make it a preferred theoretical framework for the study of 
business relationships. It is therefore appropriate to use transaction cost analysis and 
relational contracting theory as a theoretical framework due to the fact that the relationship 
between buying firms and the cocoa growers is a typical buyer seller relationship involving 
transactions over time. Rindfleisch and Heide, (1997) summarized a series of studies 
involving the use of transaction cost analysis in sales persons opportunism (Andersen, 
1988); franchisee opportunism (John, 1984) and Parkhe (1993) on perception of 
opportunistic behavior. Wathne and Heide (2000) also gave examples of Industry cases 
involving opportunism (Dutta et al 1994; Klein 1996; Kelly and Kerwin, 1992; Murry and 
Heide 1998; Walton 1997). However there is the lack of empirical research on buyer 
opportunism. This study would contribute to the extant literature through the formulation 
and testing of the various hypotheses based on the empirical setting of the cocoa supply 
chain of Ghana. In this study the research questions would seek answers from the 
perspective of the suppliers, since previous research had looked at supplier opportunism 
from the buyer’s perspective. It would therefore be interesting to research into this 
perspective in the buyer seller relationship. 
Secondly, another important justification for the conduct of this study is the use of 
the findings emanating from it for management practice and public policy formulation and 
implementation. For example management control systems can be implemented by 
management of buying firms to help in controlling the behavior of  buying agents; 
information systems can be implemented to collect timely information about transactions 
between suppliers and buying agents; reputation management by buying firms to better 
appeal to cocoa farmers and structural changes in terms of policy formulation by 
government to help create more enabling socio-political environment for the conduct of 
business within the cocoa sector of the economy. 
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1.5 Scope of the study  
This study covers cocoa growers who are suppliers within the Oda Township, a 
cocoa growing district of the Eastern region of Ghana. Irrespective of this, the study 
employs other evidence outside the study area in order to find factors explaining the 
phenomena since the situation persist in other parts of the country. The study is also 
limited to a particular buyer-supplier relationship. Hence suppliers give their perception of 
the relationship they have with a particular buying firm over a time period. Thus a dyadic 
relationship approach is used instead of a network approach, with data collected from one 
side of the dyad, specifically from supplier side of the buyer-supplier relationship under 
study. 
1.6 Organization of the study 
       The study is organized into eight chapters. Chapter one covers the introduction and 
includes the background of the study, the research problem, the justification of the study, 
scope of the study and the organization of the study. Chapter two gives the theoretical 
background for the study. Chapter three gives an overview of the cocoa industry in Ghana. 
Chapter four consists of the research model and hypotheses. In chapter five the research 
methodology employed in the study is outlined. The measurement of the variables and data 
validation is dealt with in Chapter six whiles Chapter seven deals with the empirical 
findings and data analysis. In chapter eight the final chapter, a summary, discussion, 
implication, the limitations of the study and future research are dealt with. 
1.7 Summary 
In this chapter the background to the study is provided. This is followed by the 
research problem, the justification of the study, the scope of the study, and an outline of 
the study. In the next chapter, the relevant literature on Transaction Cost Analysis; the 
behavioral assumptions and the dimensions of Transaction Cost Analysis are outlined 
(Williamson, 1975; 1985) and Relational Contracting Theory are reviewed.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
2.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter the background of the study was presented, the research problem, 
the justification of the study and the scope of the study were discussed. In this chapter, the 
relevant literature on Transaction Cost Analysis (Williamson, 1975; 1985) and Relational 
Contracting Theory are reviewed. The behavioral assumptions of Transaction Cost 
Analysis and its dimensions are also discussed.   
2.2 Transaction Cost Theory    
Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) has served as the theoretical foundation on which 
many studies in B2B have been based on over the years (Geysken et al, 2006). Transaction 
Cost was introduced by Roland Coarse in 1937; this was further developed by Williamson 
(1975, 1985). It gives explanation to how transactions are organized (Coarse 1937; 
Williamson 1975, 1985). Williamson (1975) in Berthon et al (2003) referred to 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) or Transaction cost analysis (TCA) as the way of 
organizing economic activity “within and between markets and hierarchies.” Transaction 
cost is concerned with how transactions are managed in order to reduce the total cost of 
production and transaction (Shueh-Chin Ting et al, 2007). Transaction cost refers to the 
cost that are incurred in the establishment of agreements, monitoring exchange partners 
performance so as to ensure that they adhere to contractual clauses (Joshi and Stump, 
1999). Transaction cost is ether in the form of direct costs or the opportunity cost of 
foregone transaction and it includes ex ante cost such as the cost incurred in drafting or 
negotiating a contract as well as ex post cost being cost of monitoring and enforcing 
agreements (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Williamson 1985). 
Transaction Cost theory is said to rely on the concept of opportunism and 
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governance as the main foundation (Rindfleisch et al, 2010). In transaction cost analysis 
market governance is seen as the most suitable governance mechanism for solving the 
problem of adaptation and performance ambiguities.  According to Rindfleisch et al 
(2010), many scholars have recognized that uncertainty and the investment of specific 
assets are the main characteristics that influence transaction cost (Andersen, 1985; Heide 
and John, 1990; Williamson 1985). For this reason the principle of adaptation is used in 
TCA in order to forge harmonious relationship between buyers and sellers.  
TCA suggest that monitoring acts as check or control mechanism which should 
lead to the reduction in opportunistic behavior by partners (Alchan and Demsetz, 1992) 
however, other studies suggest the opposite for example in Barkema (1995), Deci et al 
(1999) and John (1984) findings on the way monitoring affects behavior outcome suggests 
that monitoring not only control opportunism but also promotes it due to its reaction effect 
(Heide, Wathne and Rokkan, 2007). 
2.2.1 Behavioral Assumptions 
TCA employs behavioral assumptions which refer to human factors that are 
exposed when undertaking economic activities. These assumptions are: bounded 
rationality, opportunism and risk neutrality. 
 Bounded rationality refers to human behavior of economic actors that are 
“intended rational but only limited” (Simon, 1961; Williamson, 1985). Due to 
uncertainty/complexity in the business environment in which business takes place there is 
a problem of bounded rationality. This problem has to do with the fact that it is difficult to 
know beforehand (ex-ante) problems that shall be encountered should a contract/deal be 
signed (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
  Bounded rationality is based on the fact that decision makers are constrained due to 
the lack of complete information. They try to be rational but this is limited by the lack of 
information processing and the ability to communicate. This limitation renders their efforts 
to be incomplete and their action not in accordance with their goals, and thereby makes 
their efforts to be less rational although they did not intend it be so (Simon, 1957 cited in 
Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
Opportunism Williamson (1975; p.6) defines opportunism as ‘‘self-seeking with 
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guile’’. This implies that people tries to seek their own interest. This was the original 
definition according to Wathne and Heide (2000) who gave examples of opportunistic 
behavior as the falsification of expense reports; the breach of distribution contracts; bait 
and stitch tactics; quality shirking and violation of promotion agreements. Opportunism 
presents costly implications since it leads to the use of non-productive additional expenses 
for control mechanism and monitoring. It also leads to opportunity cost in the form of 
deals which are foregone (Wathne and Heide, 2000).  
  In TCA, self-interest is considered as opportunism and this has been the domain of 
research by Rokkan and Buvik (2003) and Heide and John (1990) among others who 
studied free riding behavior in voluntary chains and marketing research respectively. As a 
construct opportunism has been used in different ways but it has been measured by only a 
few. It is seen as a fixed or exogenous condition based on TCA views. Andersen (1988) 
and John (1984) see it as an endogenous variable which needs to be explained (Wathne 
and Heide, 2000).  
The forms of opportunism identified are blatant or strong form. This involves the 
deliberate misrepresentation during the initiation of a relationship (ex ante), or the 
violation over the course of the relationship that is ex post (Wathne and Heide, 2000). 
Opportunistic behavior is categorized into two general categories as active or passive by 
Wathne and Heidi, (2000). Passive opportunism is opportunism due to the problem of 
adverse selection. Here a party in an exchange relationship withholds critical information. 
Also Moral hazard problems such as the shirking or evasion of obligation in an exchange 
relation give rise to passive opportunism. On the other hand active opportunism is 
manifested when a party intentionally or deliberately lies or misrepresents material facts. It 
is also the commitment of a forbidden act or involves the actively breaching of a forbidden 
act. An example is the violation of a contract stipulations or the failure by a party to honor 
a contract (Wathne and Heide, 2000).  
Opportunism can occur under any situation but it has been noted to be facilitated by 
conditions of vulnerability such an information asymmetry problem due to a partner’s 
attributes or action or by lock-in conditions which represents vulnerability because the 
party cannot exist the relationship without incurring some economic lost. Due to this 
reason the party can only endure it by tolerating the opportunism (Wathne and Heide, 
2000). According to John (1984) the potential to behave opportunistically in a long term 
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relationship is likely due to the fact that it cannot be easily terminated or done cheaply. 
 Barney and Ouchi (1988) cited in Berthon et al (2003) also identified three types of 
opportunism: adverse selection; moral hazards and hold up. 
 Adverse selection - With respect to pre contractual opportunism. This is as a result 
of an ex ante opportunism problem and this occurs when there is information 
asymmetry about partner’s performance in the future. 
 Moral hazards - With respect to post contractual opportunism. This is an 
information asymmetry problem due to the fact that parties in an exchange 
relationship may not know the current performance capabilities of their partners.  
 Hold up - This situation is due to investment in specific asset whose value is of 
specific importance to an exchange relation. This investment leads to the likelihood 
of exercising opportunism. 
In a previous research Joshi and Stump (1996) found opportunism to be detrimental to 
the quality of an exchange relationship for example in functional conflict. Opportunism 
has also been found to have a negative effect on satisfaction (Gassenheimer et al, 1996) and 
undermines the continuation of relationship (Bucklin and Senugupta 1993; Parkhe 1993). 
In Cronso and Dahlstrom (2010) study, opportunism was found to reduce satisfaction 
within the fast food industry. 
Risk Neutrality has not received much attention although it was included by Williamson 
(Williamson 1975; 1985) in (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
2.2.2 Dimensions of a transaction 
In transaction cost analysis, the individual transaction is the unit of analysis and the 
basic elements identified are the three dimensions of a transaction; asset specificity, 
uncertainty and the frequency of exchange (Williamson, 1985).   
Asset Specificity means the degree to which a transaction needs or depends on 
transaction-specific assets (Douma and Schreuder, 2008). The deployment of specific 
assets is associated with the intention of future business (Heide and John, 1990; Tirole, 
1989). Specific asset leads to the problem of safeguarding. Specific assets create bilateral 
dependence, high switching cost and the need for coordination between firms and the need 
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for the safeguarding assets at risk (Buvik and Reve, 2002).  According to Williamson 
(1975), when there is substantial specific asset, the terms of trade between the parties 
would change from a conventional market situation into small number conditions thus 
evoking a change from market transaction to bilateral governance.  
According to Williamson (1985, 1991) and Lohtia et al (1994) six types of asset 
specificity are categorized as follows: 
1. Site specificity – This is characterized by transaction-specific investment 
with respect to specific sites such that investments done are immovable and 
expensive in terms of transfer cost. For example, investment in ports 
infrastructure and factory buildings. Investment in farm lands with respect 
to physical land preparations; buildings and the crops which cannot be 
moved to another location easily once they have been deplored. 
2. Physical asset specificity – The key feature of this type of investment 
involves investment tailored for a specific product. For example the 
engineering and manufacturing of machines for a particular product line. 
Investments in farm equipment and machinery. 
3. Human assets specificity – Investments made in human resource 
development such as acquisition of specific training, skills, capability and 
knowledge. Training of cocoa farmers in special agronomic practices with 
respect to cocoa cultivation. 
4. Brand name capital – Investment made in development of brands such that 
customers have confidence and expectation of high service level or quality 
consideration. For example Coca-Cola, Starbucks etc. The “Ghanaian 
cocoa”, that is cocoa produced from Ghana has a premium value worldwide 
due to several years of investments in quality considerations. 
5. Dedicated assets – These are investments tailored specifically towards 
meeting the needs of a particular customer. For example buying companies 
in the cocoa growing areas of Ghana are involved in the transaction-specific 
supplier development initiatives such as the granting of “soft loans” 
working capital; farm inputs such as fertilizers, insecticides and improved 
seeds. 
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6. Temporary specificity investments – These are time restricted investment 
made to cater for a particular need. For example the construction of bole 
holes for harvesting water from underground water resources pending the 
construction of water treatment plant/system. Temporal grants of cash by 
buying firms to cocoa growers during harvesting periods. 
 Uncertainty was described by Williamson (1975) as the inability of parties to 
predict unforeseen occurrences in advance. Williamson (1985) categorized uncertainty into 
Environmental uncertainty and Behavior uncertainty, referring to opportunism due to 
strategic uncertainty as behavioral uncertainty and non-strategic uncertainty to 
environmental uncertainty.  
Environmental uncertainty is referred to as “unanticipated changes in 
circumstances surrounding an exchange”. Noordewier, et al. (1990; p.82) cited in 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997). Environmental uncertainty is viewed to be unpredictable as 
well as complex. Environmental uncertainty leads to the problem of ex- ante adaptation 
due to the fact that it is difficult to put in place contingency plans for changing situations in 
the external environment before they occur (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997).  In order to 
overcome this problem parties in an exchange relationship may have to write contract 
which specifies all future uncertainties (Williamson, 1991). This problem is also linked to 
the problem of bounded rationality. 
Behavioral uncertainty involves the problem encountered in monitoring exchange 
partners performance, leading to ex post performance evaluation problems due to 
opportunism and bounded rationality (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997).  Due to this it is not 
easy to know ex ante if you will be a victim of opportunistic behavior from another party 
in a business relationship. Behavior uncertainty poses a problem only when environmental 
uncertainty leads to problem of adaptation (Williamson, 1985). An increase in behavioral 
uncertainty would lead to an increase in cost of evaluating the performance of an exchange 
partner (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997).   
Similar to behavioral uncertainty is the concept of information asymmetry in 
agency theory which deals with the problem of Moral hazard; an ex post information 
problem due to private information (Douma and Schreuder 2008). Information asymmetry 
problem leads agents to behave opportunistically. In agency theory agent opportunism is a 
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key element. An agency relation is said to exist “whenever one part (the principal) depends 
on another (the agent) to undertake some action on the principal’s behalf” (Bergen et al, 
1992). Thus the relationship between the purchasing agents who represents the various 
buying firms in the cocoa growing communities of Ghana and the buying firms (usually 
referred to as Licensed Buying Companies) can be referred to as an agency relationship.  
Frequency of exchange is the third dimension of a transaction that was considered 
by Williamson (1975; 1985). This refers to the annual orders or the amount of trade 
involved in the transactions. This dimension has not received much attention since only a 
few studies have delved into it and those which did where unable to confirm the 
hypothesized effect according to Rindfleisch and Heide (1997). 
2.3 Relational Contracting Theory 
Relational Contracting Theory (RCT) was introduced by Macaulay (1963) and later 
Macneil (1978; 1980). The theory posits that the prior history of a relationship is expected 
to lead to certain norms; trust and personal relationship that would affect the way the 
relationship between a manufacturer and a supplier are organized (Buvik and Reve, 2002; 
Macneil, 1978, 1980).  Relational Contracting also predicts that as the relation develops 
relational norms will emerge and this would provide for the safeguarding of the 
relationship (Brachach and Eccles, 1989; Buvik and Halskau, 2001; Granovetter, 1985).  It 
is expected that relational norms would act as a safeguarding mechanism against the 
exercise of opportunistic behavior.  
These norms come into being as a result of extensive collaboration between the 
actors involved in purchasing and have gone through a lot of stages (Buvik and Burki, 
2010; Heide, 1994). It is expected that as the relation evolves certain values and norms are 
developed which would serve as a guideline for ongoing exchanges dictating inter-firm 
exchanges and the contracting practices.  This implies that the relational contract is 
expected to be adjusted as time goes on and at any time it would depend on the current 
status of the relationship and the history of the relationship (Buvik and Halskau, 2001).  
Due to this the governance form would be different from what was in place at the 
beginning of the relationship.  
For example, it is expected that the relationship between a cocoa grower (supplier) 
and the purchasing agent (buyer), both of whom have interacted cordially over a period of 
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time such that there have been tranquility in relationship outcomes over that period and the 
present cordial status would have developed some normative behavior such as relationship 
satisfaction, normative expectations and trustworthiness. Such relationships are therefore 
expected to be governed by relational norms without explicit written agreement and by the 
partners in the exchange relationship being able to accommodate each other without 
reference to some laid down rules. Such relationships are characterized by friendships, 
personal relationships and the granting of favors to each other without recourse or the fear 
that one party will take advantage of the other and behave opportunistically.     
2.3.1 Relationship duration, relational norms and trust  
Relational duration has been recognized to be important in the marketing literature 
(e.g. Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). It has been noted to be the main element in relational 
exchange theory and is strongly related to relational governance (Lee et al., 2004 in Buvik 
and Burki, 2010). It has been noted to be important in accessing the form of governance 
structure that should be in place and also lead to relational norms (Heidi and John, 1990; 
Macneil, 1980).  
 The history of a relationship brings about norms such as trust and a satisfactory 
buyer-seller relationship. Trust is also regarded by the theory as a necessary factor in 
relationship building (Macneil, 1980). Trust is relevant when there is risk of mutual 
dependence as relational trust is derived from repeated interactions over time. Norms as a 
governance structure is developed in buyer-seller relationships as a result of trust between 
contracting parties who have dealt with each other over a period of time (Rousseau et al, 
1998). Trust has also been found to reduce uncertainty and the threat of opportunism 
(Heide and John, 1990; Wathne and Heide, 2004).  
It is expected that relationships between cocoa growers and buying firms that have 
prior interactions with each party, and are satisfactory and cordial are likely to be 
characterized by trust. Such trustworthy relationships are likely to have been developed 
based on prior experience as a result of the history of the relationship. 
2.3.2 Relationship duration, relational norms and opportunism 
Relational contracting theory predicts that as relationships evolve over time 
relational norms are established (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Granovetter, 1985; Macneil, 
1980). Relational norms will act as a reference on allowed behavior limits and also act as a 
check against opportunistic behavior (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Ouchi, 1979; 
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Stinchcombe, 1987). Bradach and Eccles (1989; p.108) noted that when economic 
transactions are embedded in personal relationships the hazards of opportunism are 
diminished and the need for elaborate formal governance is rendered unnecessary.   
Ex post transaction cost incurred through minimizing conflict, control and 
monitoring efforts for dealing with opportunism are decreased as the threat of opportunism 
is diminished due to the emergence of shared values and relational norms acting as a guild 
which are expected to safeguard the relationship against opportunism (Williamson, 1991; 
Ring and Van De Ven, 1992). Thus as opportunism diminishes ex post transaction cost is 
also reduced (Buvik and John, 2000; Ring and Van De Ven, 1992). Joshi (1998) found 
relative dependent manufactures are able to resist powerful suppliers through opportunistic 
behavior and they do so only when low relational norms characterized their relationship 
with the supplier. Joshi and Stump (1999) also found out that relational norms are capable 
of increasing commitment whiles it decreases opportunism.  
In applying relational contract theory to this study, for example, it is expected that 
the relationship between a cocoa grower (supplier) and the purchasing agent (buyer), both 
of whom have interacted over a period of time and knows each other well will have 
developed personal friendships in their day-to-day interactions. Such relationships will be 
characterized by some level of trustworthiness and are therefore expected to be governed 
by relational norms such that the hazards of opportunism are diminished and the need for 
elaborate formal governance is rendered unnecessary.  
Buying firms that have developed such cordial and trustworthy relationship with 
their suppliers are likely to be perceived by the suppliers with much admiration and 
approval. Buying agents representing such firms too are likely to be seen as working in the 
best interest of cocoa growers as a result of the mutual beneficial relationship outcomes, 
trustworthiness and good quality of the relationship. It is therefore expected that cocoa 
growers in such relationships will view the buying firms and their agents as being less 
opportunistic. This is because relationships characterized by friendships and personal 
relationships; trustworthiness and the granting of favors to each other without fear that one 
party will take advantage of the other and behave opportunistically are perceived in a more 
positive outlook. 
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2.4 Summary 
In this chapter transaction cost analysis and relational contracting theory which are 
the main theory for this study is presented. In transaction cost analysis, bounded 
rationality; opportunism; specific assets and uncertainty are presents whenever a 
transaction takes place. Specific assets lead to dependence and this increases the incidence 
of opportunism. In relational contracting theory relationship duration, norms and trust 
guides the behavior of business relationships in a buyer seller relationship. The next 
chapter presents an overview of the cocoa industry in Ghana. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE COCOA INDUSTRY IN GHANA - AN OVERVIEW 
3.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, a review of the relevant literature on transaction cost 
analysis and relational contracting theory was presented. This chapter discusses an 
overview of the cocoa industry in Ghana. The Cocoa industry in Ghana was characterized 
by a monopsony situation where there are many suppliers with only one buyer. As part of 
the World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) the sector was liberalized in 
1992/93. Ghana Cocoa Board’s (COCOBOD) monopoly over the internal purchase of the 
crop and external marketing of the crop was changed with the introduction of some level 
of competition in the internal marketing of the product. Private participation was 
introduced in the internal purchase and marketing of the crop. This chapter therefore looks 
at the history and development of cocoa in Ghana, cocoa production, marketing, delivery 
and processing. 
3.2 History and development of Cocoa in Ghana 
Cocoa is a corruption of the word “Cacao” which comes from the botanical name 
of cocoa “cacao theobroma”. It was introduced into Ghana in 1876 by Tetteh Quarshie a 
Ghanaian blacksmith who worked in Fernando Po (now Bioko in Equatorial Guinea). He 
returned home to Ghana with a single cocoa pod, the seeds of which he planted at 
Mampong in Akwapim, a town 50km from Accra (Amoah, 1998; Glavee-Geo, 2012). 
Earlier, the Dutch missionaries were reported to have planted cocoa in the coastal areas of 
Ghana (then Gold Coast) in 1815, and Basel missionaries also planted cocoa at Aburi in 
1857 but these were unsuccessful until the introduction of the crop by Tetteh Quarshie 
(Amoah, 1998; COCOBOD, 2012; Glavee-Geo, 2012).  
 The development of cocoa in Ghana has been categorized into 4 phases according 
to Kolavalli and Vigneri (2011) as: Introduction and exponential growth (1888-1937), 
Stagnation and growth post-independence (1938-1964), the down turn (1964-1982) 
Recovery and expansion (1983- 2008). These developments are illustrated in Figure 3.1 
below. 
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Figure 3.1 Ghana’s cocoa production 1900-2008 
 
Source: Kolavalli and Vigneri (2011) 
3.3 Cocoa Production 
 According to Quartey (2007) and Glavee-Geo (2012), an estimated 1.2million 
hectare of land is used for the cultivation of cocoa in Ghana with a population of about 
800,000 smallholder farmers engaged in the cultivation and sale of this crop. The ideal 
weather condition for cocoa is tropical environment. Hence, it does well in tropical 
rainforest and requires temperatures of between 18°C and 32°C (65°F to 90°F) and rainfall 
between 1000mm to 3000mm (400 inches to 1,100 inches) per year. The crop is a 
perennial tree crop with a life-cycle of between twenty-five to thirty years (Awua, 2002; 
Glavee-Geo, 2012). There are two main cocoa seasons in Ghana. The main crop season 
starts from October till June and the mild or light season is between July till September 
according to Anthiono and Darkoa (2009). 
The main cocoa growing areas in Ghana are in six regions of Ghana notably the 
Ashanti, Eastern, Brong Ahafo, Central, Western and the Volta region where there are 
favorable agronomic conditions for the cultivation of the crop. This is shown in Figure 3.2 
below. As can be seen from Figure 3.2, the cultivation of cocoa is concentrated mostly in 
the forest belt of Ghana covering the middle belt and extending to the western part of the 
country. These areas present favorable conditions for the cultivation of the crop after 
which they are transported finally to the south for export; or sale to local processors.  
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Figure 3.2 Cocoa Cultivation in Ghana 
 
Source (Cadbury Skills Space 2012) 
Ghana was between 1911 and 1978 the largest exporter of cocoa producing an 
average 30 percent of the world market. Currently it is the second-largest grower of cocoa 
after the Ivory Coast (Amoah, 1995). Figures from the International Cocoa Organization 
(ICCO) shows Ghana produced 662,000 and 632,000 tons in the 2008/2009, 2009/2010 
seasons respectively. In the current state of recovery and expansion Ghana is aiming to 
produce between 850,000 – 900,000 tons in the ongoing 2011/12 season after hitting a 
record of over 1 million tons in the 2010/2011 season (ICCO, 2012). According to the 
World Cocoa Foundation (2010), Ghana’s production for 2009/2010 accounted for 21% of 
global production. The world cocoa production from 2008 to 2011 is shown in figure 3.3 
below. 
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Table 3.1 World Cocoa Production 
 
Source: ICCO Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa statistics XXVII, Cocoa year 2010/2011. 
Cocoa production for export has been the main export earner for the country. It 
provides employment for millions of people whose livelihood dependent on it and   
contributes about 9% to agriculture GDP (Anin-Kwapong and Frimpong, 2004).  Between 
1990 and 1999 the crop contributed about 3.4% of total gross domestic product and 29% 
of total export revenue per annum, (Anon, 2001) and between 2000 and 2003 it 
contributed 22%  (Dormon et al. 2004).  According to a Bank of Ghana report, as at the 
end of November 2011, cocoa earned Ghana $1.9 billion (Bank of Ghana, 2011). Due to 
the importance of the cocoa sector to the economy of Ghana, the state has always been 
involved in its management through the state owned Ghana Cocoa Board.  
3.4 Cocoa Marketing in Ghana 
From 1947 until 1993 the state was the only buyer of cocoa through the Ghana 
Cocoa Board (known as COCOBOD). The Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) was the sole 
buyer of cocoa in the country through Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC) its marketing 
branch by virtue of a legislative instrument. It had direct control over the purchasing of the 
commodity right from the farm gate to when it is finally exported. COCOBOD has 
monopolistic power being the sole purchaser of cocoa in Ghana and this gives it a strong 
buyer power and bargaining power. This affects the industry because the price at which the 
commodity is sold is determined by the buyer COCOBOD (Anthiono and Aikins, 2009). 
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3.4.1 Cocoa Market Reforms 
As part of the World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) the sector was 
liberalized in 1992/93. COCOBOD’s monopoly over the internal purchase of the crop and 
external marketing of the crop was changed with the introduction of some level of 
competition in the internal marketing of the product with the involvement of private 
participants who are engaged in the purchase of the crop from the farmers. Farmers could 
now sell to 28 private licensed buying companies (LBC’s) including the Produce Buying 
Company a subsidiary of COCOBOD (World Bank, 2011). However, COCOBOD still 
exercises much control over the governance of the chain horizontally by virtue of the fact 
that it is the main institution mandated by the state to regulate the industry (Glavee-Geo, 
2012). Ghana is currently the only country where the government has control over the 
whole internal purchasing of cocoa even though there is partial liberalization with private 
participation. The sale of the commodity to domestic processors and direct export of the 
commodity by the LBCs therefore represent a very insignificant link in the supply chain as 
shown in figure 3.4 by the dotted lines (Glavee-Geo, 2012). The state still controls the 
prize at which the product is bought by the COCOBOD through the accredited buying 
firms (Doherty and Tranchell, 2005; Vigneri and Santos, 2007). 
3.5 Cocoa Supply Chain 
The cocoa supply chain involves several tiers starting from the farmers through 
various licensed buying companies (LBC’s) to the Ghana Cocoa Marketing board 
(COCOBOD) before been sold to domestic processor or exported to manufacturing plants 
in other countries. This study focuses only on the relationship between farmers and 
licensed buying companies (LBC’s) from the farmers’ perspective. 
The cocoa supply chain as shown in Figure 3.3 below is a more simplified 
illustration of the chain. The chain integrates the internal marketing of the commodity 
within the producer country Ghana with that of external global marketing through 
international trading of the commodity. The global supply chain of cocoa is made up of a 
complicated network of supply chain management components and their activities and 
supply chain business processes. It starts from the supply of the cocoa beans until it is 
exported and processed into finished cocoa products (Glavee-Geo, 2012). It is a complex 
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network involving growers (suppliers), buyers/traders (LBCs), COCOBOD the exporter 
grinders/ converters, manufactures and retailers. Although LBCs have been granted 
permission to export the commodity and to sell some of their purchases to domestic 
processors, they can only do so through the COCOBOD. The sale of the commodity to 
domestic processors and direct export of the commodity by the LBCs therefore represent a 
very insignificant link in the value chain as shown in figure 3.4 by the dotted lines (ibid). 
 
Figure 3.3 Cocoa Commodity Supply Chain 
 
Source: Adapted from Gilbert (2008), Glavee-Geo (2012) 
 
 
3.6 Cocoa Delivery 
The delivery of cocoa, starts first with the farmers delivering cocoa from their 
farms to about 3000 depots or locations known as “society” or buying centers comprising 
of village or hamlet cottage where the licensed buying companies (LBC’s) buys the cocoa. 
At these centers the purchasing clerks (PC) acts as agents for the LBC’s and they are 
responsible for preparing the crop for weighing (Anthiono and Aikins, 2009). The Quality 
Control Division (QCD) of the COCOBOD does the grading and sealing of the cocoa at 
the depot before they are transported by private transport service companies to either one 
of the three take-over locations in Tema port, Takoradi port or Kaasi inland port in Kumasi 
where it is delivered to Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC) the export subsidiary of 
COCOBOD after it has been checked and re-inspected. CMC sees to it that the cocoa is 
loaded into shipping containers and shipped abroad to cocoa product manufacturers in 
more than 25 locations (World Bank, 2012).  
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3.7 Cocoa processing 
Cocoa processing involves various supply chain management processes and value 
adding activities. The processing of cocoa involves the conversion of cocoa into the nib, 
liquor, cake, butter and powder. Firms engaged in cocoa processing are known as grinders 
or converters, and are either multinationals or local companies. Some multinational 
converters are located in the producer countries. The large converters are trading 
companies who are not involved in manufacturing of chocolate and the large chocolate 
manufactures which have the capacity to process the cocoa beans can also buy from the 
exporters directly (Amoah, 1995, 1998; Gilbert, 2008), but this is not the case in Ghana 
since they can only buy through the Ghana Cocoa Marketing board (COCOBOD). The 
global cocoa processing industry is dominated by a few large manufacturers whilst in 
Ghana, the domestic processing of cocoa is done by 8 grinders but only three of these are 
dominant. The firms are Cargill, Barry Callebaut and ADM. Ghana Cocoa Board 
(COCOBOD) delivered 129,074 metric tons to 7 of these grinders and they processed 50, 
933 ton of cocoa liquor, 22,944 tons of cocoa butter, 19,180 tons of cocoa cake and 5,054 
tons of cocoa powder (World Bank, 2012).    
3.8 Summary 
In this chapter, an overview of the cocoa industry of Ghana was presented, starting 
with a brief history and development of the industry, the production, delivery and 
processing of cocoa. The supply chain of the sector was also presented. The structure and 
the main stakeholders of concern in this study; the suppliers (farmers), the buyers (LBC’s) 
and the industry regulator the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) will be presented in 
chapter 5 under the research setting. In chapter Four, the research model and the 
hypothesis of the study would be presented. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the research model on which the research hypotheses were 
developed for the study is presented. The various constructs presented in the model are 
also defined and discussed. Transaction Cost Analysis and Relational Contracting Theory 
which were reviewed in chapter two are applied in developing the various hypotheses in 
the study. Based on the hypotheses presented an empirical test is presented in chapter 
seven. 
4.2 Overview of research model 
The purpose of the study is to test the influence of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable buyer opportunism (OPPOR). The model illustrated in Figure 4.1 
below focuses on how the independent variables in the study; relationship duration 
(REDURA);  satisfaction (SATIS); buyer control (BUYCON) and  transaction-specific 
supplier development (SUDEV) influence the dependent variable buyer opportunism 
(OPPOR). The control variables in the model which are: sales volume (SALESVOL); trust 
(TRUST); and relative power (REPOWER) are also presented.  
An overview of the model presented in Figure 4.1 shows a negative association 
posited between relationship duration (REDURA) and buyer opportunism (OPPOR); 
suppliers who have prior relationship with buying firms and have been dealing with them 
for some time are expected to perceive their exchange partners as been less opportunistic. 
Buyer control is hypothesized to increase opportunism. Supplier who perceive buying 
agents and their firms as having an overly controlling behavior are likely to be perceived 
as being opportunistic. Hence an increase in the construct buyer control (BUYCON) is 
expected to have a positive influence on buyer opportunism (OPPOR), whilst a decrease in 
the supplier satisfaction (SATIS) and transaction-specific supplier development (SUDEV) 
are each postulated to increases perceived buyer opportunism (OPPOR). Dissatisfied 
suppliers are more likely to perceive buying firms’ purchasing agents as being more 
opportunistic. Buying firms which invest less in their supplying partners are also likely to 
be perceived as being more opportunistic despite the need for such interventions by the 
suppliers to improve on their performance. The independent variable relationship duration 
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(REDURA) is again used as an interaction variable to measure the moderating effect of the 
variable supplier satisfaction (SATIS) on the influence of relationship duration on the 
dependent variable buyer opportunism though this is not illustrated in the diagram 
presented in Figure 4.1. The schematic representation of the research model is presented in 
Figure 4.1 below:  
Figure 4.1 Research Model 
 
 
Source: Own source 
4.3 Definition of constructs 
4.3.1 Dependent variable 
Buyer opportunism (OPPOR) 
Williamson (1975; p.6) defines opportunism as ‘‘self-seeking with guile’’. The 
scale is used to describe the degree to which a buyer is seen to be behaving in ways 
consistent with self-seeking interest.  Examples of opportunistic behavior documented in 
the extant literature includes such behaviors as withholding or distorting information, lies, 
stealing, cheating, calculated efforts to mislead, disguise, confuse,  and shirking or failing 
to fulfill promises or obligations (John, 1984; Williamson, 1985). Opportunism has been 
the subject of many researches (Cronso and Dahlstrom, 2010; Joshi and Stump 1999; 
Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Rokkan and Buvik, 2003; Sabel, 1993). It has been noted as the 
biggest threat to the integration of the supply chain (Ellram 1991; p.13). 
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4.3.2 Independent variables 
Relationship duration (REDURA) 
Relationship duration (REDURA) refers to the number of years that partners in a 
buyer-seller relationship have been interacting over a period of time (Buvik and Halskau, 
2001; Heide and Miner, 1992). It has also been referred to as link duration by Kotabe et al. 
(2003) and use as a measure of the experiences gain from interacting between a buyer and 
seller. Relationship duration is operationalized as the number of years that a supplier has 
been dealing with a buying firm in this study.   
Buyer control (BUYCON) 
 Buyer control has been conceptualized as the extent of the supplier’s decision 
making that the buyer has authority and control over in a particular relationship (Buvik and 
Andersen, 2011; Heide, 1994). In this study, buyer control refers to the control of one 
partner by the other in a horizontal chain with respect to channel activities. 
Supplier satisfaction (SATIS) 
 Supplier satisfaction has been defined variously by different authors (Ghijsen et 
al., 2009).  Benton and Maloni (2005; p.2) defined it “as a feeling of equity with the supply 
chain relationship no matter what power imbalance exists between the buyer and seller 
dyad”. To Geyskens et al. (1999; p.224) a channel member’s satisfaction is usually defined 
as “a positive affective state resulting from appraisal of all aspects of a firm’s working 
relationship with another firm”. In this study supplier satisfaction is operationalized as 
both economic and social satisfaction derived within the buyer-seller relationship. 
Transaction-Specific Supplier development (SUDEV) 
 Watts and Hahn, (1993; p.12) defines supplier development  as ‘‘a long-term 
cooperative effort between a buying firm and its suppliers to upgrade the suppliers’ 
technical, quality, delivery, and cost capabilities and to foster ongoing improvements’’. 
Krause and Ellram (1997; p. 21) also defines supplier development as involving ‘‘any 
effort of a buying firm with its suppliers to increase the performance and/or capabilities of 
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the supplier and meet the buying firm’s supply needs’’. This may include the use of 
limited as well as extensive practices by the buying firm. Supplier development according 
to Ghijsen et al. (2009) is usually initiated by buyers as a means of meeting the short term 
and long term objectives of the business relationship. This study refers to the provision of 
credits, inputs and extension services etc. by the buyers to the suppliers of cocoa to 
represent transaction-specific supplier development. 
4.3.3 Control variables  
Three control variables, sales volume (SALESVOL); trust (TRUST); and relative 
power (REPOWER) were in incorporated into the model. Control variables are included in 
order to provide alternative explanation for the dependent variable.  
Sales volume (SALESVOL) 
Sales volume refers to the annual amount of sales by a seller to a buyer. Sales 
volume is expected to influence satisfaction. High volumes of sales are expected to lead to 
economic and social satisfaction and hence overall satisfaction with the relationship. 
Trust (TRUST) 
Trust is defined as “a willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has 
confidence” according to (Moorman et al., 1992; p.82). The role of trust is summarized by 
Sullivan and Peterson (1982; p.30) in Dwyer et al. (1987) as where parties trust one 
another there is the possibility of them overcoming challenges with regards to power 
conflict, low profitability and the likes. Thus the existence of trust is seen as an adequate 
safeguard thereby requiring no formal contracts against eventuality. Trust just like 
satisfaction have both been suggested as key factors of relationship marketing, but, 
satisfaction is rather seen as an important source for trust (Selnes, 1998). Suppliers who 
trust buying agents see them as been less opportunistic. Agents of buying firms 
(purchasing clerks) and some growers have had cordial relationship over time, where 
personal relationships and friendship have developed. Such cordial and trustworthy 
relationships have made the growers to perceive the buyers as been less opportunistic. 
Relative power (REPOWER) 
 Maloni and Benton (2000) defined Power as “the ability of one firm (the source) to 
influences the intentions and actions of another firm (the target)”. The relative power of a 
firm over another is the result of the net dependence of one on the other. This may be due 
to the differences in turnover or value of sales and size of suppliers compared to buying 
companies. These differences place the suppliers in a less powerful position in the 
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exchange such that the buying companies are more powerful and have the leading role in 
establishing policies relating to relationship administration and distribution of rewards ( 
Glavee-Geo 2012; Griffith et al, 2006). In this study there is relative power between the 
suppliers of cocoa and the LBC’s the buyers. This gives the buyers the power to determine 
the terms of the trade such as quality consideration. 
4.4 Hypotheses 
Buyer control and buyer opportunism 
Buyer control corresponds to centralization, where the concentration of decision 
making authority or the degree of vertical control in the buyer seller relationship is on the 
buyer side (Heide, 2003). The implementation of this governance arrangement is expected 
to stabilize the terms of trade and overcome the performance measurement difficulties 
linked to bilateral dependence (Williamson, 1985). Transaction Cost theory posits that the 
presence of transaction-specific assets within an exchange relationship leads to 
“Contractual hazards” for this reason specialized governance structure in the form of 
vertical control are expected to be in place to act as a safeguard (Heide and John, 1992; 
Williamson, 1985). 
 Buvik and Andersen (2011) referred to hierarchical governance as buyer control in 
a buyer-seller relationship and stated that specific supplier investments and hierarchical 
governance (buyer control) leads to opportunism. In this study buyer control has been seen 
to be exercised by the buyer at the horizontal level due to the exercise of authority and 
control over the decisions making of the suppliers. Due to the fact that dependency creates 
an instance of power imbalance, the supplier’s dependency on the buyers creates a relative 
power situation where power is more towards the buyer’s and this enhances the buyer’s 
ability to control the decisions of the supplier (Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Emerson 1962; 
Joshi, 1998). Suppliers may retaliate as profess by the resistance perspective of Joshi 
(1998) through counter measures (Rokkan and Buvik, 2003) but in the case of this study 
the suppliers are unable to retaliate because of the structural power of the buyers in 
comparison to the suppliers and the monopsony situation of the market.     
Hierarchical control by the buyer makes the suppliers to perceive buyers who have 
much control over them to be more opportunistic.  This is because buyers who have more 
control over the suppliers are those that can get the opportunity to exercise that control and 
behave opportunistically. The influence of terms of trade by the buyers through quality 
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assurance measures which are non-negotiable. For example buying agents representing the 
buying firms exercise control over the cocoa growers not only in terms of ensuring quality 
consideration and price but also as to who gets support in terms of credit, tools and 
equipment and rewards. This control especially at the personal level between the buying 
agents and the growers make it easier for the buying agents to dictate terms of trade ( 
Glavee-Geo and Buvik 2012a). Suppliers therefore see this controlling behavior of buyers 
as a means through which opportunistic behaviors can be realized. Based on this it is 
proposed that: 
H1: There is a positive association between buyer control and buyer opportunism. 
Supplier Satisfaction and buyer opportunism 
Research on supplier satisfaction has been noted to be few and those that exist are 
mainly conceptual in nature (Benton and Maloni, 2005) in Ghijsen et al, (2009).  
According to Rodriquez et al (2006) satisfaction has been considered as one-dimensional 
by some authors (Andaleeb, 1996; Anderson and Narus, 1984; Ganesan, 1994; Selnes, 
1998; and others) in the literature due to its affective nature.  Whilst others recognizes that 
satisfaction has two dimensions: economic and non-economic, psychological or social 
satisfaction (Gassheimer et al., 1995; Gassheimer et al. 1996; Geyskens et al, 1999; 
Geyskens & Steenkamp, 2000; Rodriquez et al, 2006).  Geyskens et al, (1999) distinguish 
between economic satisfaction which has to do with the economic rewards of the 
relationship and noneconomic satisfaction which is fulfillment and gratification derived 
from psychosocial aspect of the relations with an exchange partner. 
Opportunism is an important variable in an exchange according to transaction cost 
analysis. Williamson (1975:6) defines opportunism as ‘‘self-seeking with guile’’.  
Opportunism was found within the fast food industry to reduce franchisee satisfaction in a 
study by Gassenheimer et al. (1996). In another study support was found for the negative 
association between satisfaction and opportunism by Cronso and Dahlstrom (2010). Due to 
its negative effect it undermines relationship continuation (Bucklin and Senugupta 1993; 
Parkhe 1993).  The exercise of opportunistic behavior by an exchange partner leads to a 
reduction in both social and economic satisfaction of the other party or the relationship as a 
whole (Glavee-Geo and Buvik, 2012b). In this case the satisfaction in terms of the 
economic benefits derived from the sales of cocoa by the suppliers; the social satisfaction 
as a result of personal friendship and cordial relationships developed from past 
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transactions among other benefits makes the suppliers to see the buyers as people who care 
for them and want the best for them. Thus perceived opportunism by an exchange partner 
in a relationship is expected to results in dissatisfaction. Suppliers who have more 
satisfactory buyer-seller relationship with the buyers perceive them as being less 
opportunistic and suppliers who perceive their buying agents to be behaving opportunistic 
would be dissatisfied and are unlikely to continue in the relationships (ibid). It is therefore 
propose that: 
H2: There is a negative association between supplier satisfaction and buyer 
opportunism.  
Transaction-Specific Supplier development and buyer opportunism 
Transaction-specific supply development entails investments made by a buying 
firm in its suppliers (Wagner, 2006). These supplier development efforts are intended to 
improve performance and the supply chain as a whole when used with other factors such 
as effective communication, the involvement of top management from the buyer side and 
the long term prospect of the buyer (Handfield et al., 2000; Humphreys et al., 2004; 
Krause and Ellram, 1997). Some supply development efforts are relationship specific in 
that the buying firm commits time and resource towards the supplier development through 
site visitations, offering of technical assistance, training and education etc. (Krause and 
Ellram, 1997; Wagner, 2006).  
Buying firms invest in transaction-specific dedicated assets. The level of these 
transaction-specific investments by a buyer to a seller is considered a sign of the buyer’s 
commitment to that supplier. From the compliance perspective in Joshi (1998) the 
employment of specific assets by manufacture or buying firm implies a long term profit 
and this implies the buying firm will not act opportunistically towards their suppliers 
because should they do so, this might leads to supplier hold-ups which will threaten the 
continuation of the exchange business.  Suppliers can also behave opportunistically after 
receiving such investments due to the fact that they know it is not refundable on the 
cancellation of the relationship. However in this study it is the case of the buyers who 
manifested opportunism in the buyer seller relationship. The buyer’s investment in 
suppliers is therefore expected to be inversely associated with the buyer’s opportunistic 
behavior to the supplier (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Parkhe, 1993).   
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Transaction-specific supplier development in terms of the provision of credit; 
training and education; equipment and tools improved seedlings and performance 
improvement initiatives are supposed to help the growers to improve upon their 
performance and increase their outputs. Such investments by buyers in the growers does 
not only helps improve the suppliers’ performance but also makes the suppliers perceive 
the buying firms as people who cared for them and want them to improve on their 
performance (Glavee-Geo and Buvik, 2012b). The suppliers who are recipient of such 
interventions see the buyers as people who are less opportunistic. In view of the above 
discussion we posit that: 
H3: There is a negative association between transaction-specific supplier 
development and buyer opportunism. 
Relationship duration, Supplier satisfaction and Buyer opportunism 
Relational duration or the history of a relationship (Heidi, 1994) has been 
recognized to be important in accessing the form of governance structure that should be in 
place and also lead to relational norms (Heidi and John, 1990; Macneil, 1980). The history 
of relationship brings about norms formation and the development of personal relationship 
which guides the way the buyer seller relationship is organized (Buvik and John, 2000; 
Macneil, 1980). Relational contracting theory posits that prior history of relationship is 
expected to lead to certain norms such as trust and personal relationships that will affect 
the way the relationship between two parties are organized (Buvik and Reve, 2002; 
Macneil, 1979, 1980). The relational norms established over time during an exchange 
relation then act as a reference on acceptable behavior limiting opportunism (Bradach and 
Eccles, 1989; Buvik and Burki, 2010; Ouchi, 1979; Stinchcombe, 1987). 
 Relationship duration is expected to reduce the incidence of opportunism within a 
buyer seller relationship. However according to John (1984; p.279) the potential for 
partner to be opportunistic is greater with time due to the fact that it is difficult to break the 
relationship or too expensive to be done.  The buyer-seller relationship is also expected to 
result in satisfaction (Rodriguez et al, 2006). Various studies have studied the issue of 
satisfaction and its importance in channel relationships (Brown and Frazier, 1978; Dwyer 
et al 1987; Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). In these studies, it was found out that 
satisfaction increases a channel member orientation to long term relationships, ensures 
 31 
continuation of relations and reduces conflict.  However, opportunism has been found to 
reduce satisfaction. It is thus expected that satisfaction will play a moderating role between 
relationship during and buyer opportunism. Suppliers of cocoa who have been in a longer 
buyer-seller relationship with the buyers of their commodity are posited to perceive the 
buyers to be less opportunistic as relationship duration is expected to reduce perceived 
opportunism as depicted in figure 4.2 below. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the moderating effect of supplier satisfaction on the influence 
of relationship duration on buyer opportunism. In the top section perceived buyer 
opportunism is seen to be decreasing as relationship duration increases when supplier 
satisfaction is high. Whilst in the bottom part when supplier satisfaction is low or 
moderate, buyer opportunism is now seen to be increasing as relationship duration 
increases. A fuller explanation is given below, using the matrix in figure 4.3 below. 
Figure 4.2 Moderating effect of Supplier satisfaction  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Matrix of Relationship duration, Supplier satisfaction and Buyer opportunism 
 
 
Cell 1 A cocoa supplier who has had a short relationship with a buyer and is highly 
satisfied with the relationship outcome perceives buyer opportunism to be low. 
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Cell 2 this shows an instance where a supplier has long history of dealing with a particular 
buying firm and its buying agent and is highly satisfied in terms of relationship outcomes. 
Such a supplier is expected to perceive the buying firm as being less opportunistic. 
Cell 3 here relationship duration is at an earlier stage of the relationship and supplier 
satisfaction is low/moderate, the perception of the supplier is that the buyer’s opportunism 
is increasing. 
Cell 4 finally when a suppliers duration of exchange with a buyer is long but the 
satisfaction derived from this exchange has always been low then relationship duration 
enforces his dissatisfaction of the supplier and his perception is that, the buyer’s 
opportunism is seen to be increasing with time. Meaning that, suppliers who have had 
unsatisfactory relationship outcomes with buying firms and their agents after several years 
of dealing with them are likely to perceive the buyers and their agents as being very 
opportunistic with time. Hence in view of the above discussion, we suggest that: 
H4: Under conditions of high supplier satisfaction, there is a stronger negative 
association between relationship duration and buyer opportunism than under 
condition of low/moderate supplier satisfaction. 
 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the research model and the hypotheses for the study have been 
presented. The various constructs included in the model were defined. The control 
variables; the hypothesized main effects and the interaction effect were also presented.  In 
the following chapter the research methodology adopted in the study is presented. 
 33 
CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter discussed the research model and the hypotheses that were 
formulated for the study based on the research questions (chapter1) and the theoretical 
framework (chapter 2). This chapter presents a discussion of methodological issues 
relevant to the study. It gives an overview of the philosophical position of the study; the 
research design, the research setting and geographical location of the study. It also 
discusses data collection strategies and sampling procedures and how these 
methodological issues were addressed in the study. 
5.2 Philosophical Position 
Researchers are advised to consider their philosophical position as an aid in their 
decision on a choice of a research design (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002).  Two main research 
paradigms were suggested to be used in marketing research (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002; 
Malhotra and Birks 2006). These research paradigms are; the positivist and the 
interpretivist paradigms. These two paradigms have been referred to by other different 
names; the positive research paradigm is also referred to as quantitative, objective, 
scientific experimentalist or traditionalist whilst the interpretivist is also referred to as 
qualitative, subjective, humanistic, phenomenological and revolutionist (Malhotra and 
Birks 2006). 
According to Malhotra and Birks (2006) the positivist use a deductive approach in 
arriving at conclusion by first identifying an area based on a well-developed theory for 
research. The issue for the enquiring thus is based on theoretical framework already 
established. Variables are then identified to be measured in the form of hypotheses and an 
instrument to measure these variables are developed. Followed by the collection of 
responses based on a uniformly accepted language and logic after which the responses are 
analyzed based on established theoretical framework. The researcher then tests the theory 
(could also be an integration of different theories) as to whether the hypotheses are 
supported or rejected, and hence an existing theory is developed incrementally by the 
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testing of the theory in a new situation. The interpretivist on the other hand uses the 
inductive method to arrive at a conclusion by following this procedure. The researcher 
identifies an area for research base on little or no theoretical framework. The focus of the 
research is either to observed, or responses are collected from within a particular context 
and the responses of respondents are used as a guide to conform to that particular context. 
After this the broad themes identified are discussed by either observation or further 
probing to gain more insight into the themes. From here the researcher then develop the 
theory through the search for things happening and the linkage of these happenings. A 
model is thus developed based on the enfolding events (Malhotra and Birks 2006).  
The philosophical position followed by this study is the positive perspective.  The 
work is based on established theories (Transaction Cost Analysis and Relational 
Contracting Theory) variables where identified to be measured based on the hypotheses 
formed and responses were collected which are analyzed based on established theoretical 
frame work in chapter 7. This study is quantitative in nature since it uses research 
techniques that quantify data and involves the application of statistical analysis (Malhotra 
and Birks 2006).  
5.3 Research Design 
According to Churchill (1999; p.98) research design is a plan showing how the 
researcher would be collecting and analyzing data. It shows the steps followed in 
undertaking a study. The purpose of a research design is to ensure that the study 
undertaken conforms to the problems and also less economical procedures are used.  
Churchill (1999) noted that there is no single procedure or framework in research design 
rather they have been classified into basic types based on the basic objective of the 
research:  as explorative, descriptive or casual. Malhotra and Birks (2006) on the other 
hand categorized research design into two broad categories exploratory design which 
includes quantitative and qualitative and conclusive design which includes descriptive and 
causal research.  
This study uses a descriptive research design which is a form of conclusive 
research. Descriptive research is concerned with finding out the number of times 
something happens or the relation between two things or variables (Churchill 1999).  It is 
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used for the purpose of describing the attributes of groups, for estimating a proportion of a 
population that behaves in a like manner and to make predictions. Its major objective is to 
describe something for this reason it is pre planned and structured and the research 
question and hypotheses are specified beforehand. It also specifies the data collection 
methods and the criteria for selecting information sources (Malhotra and Birks 2006). 
Descriptive research presupposes that the researcher already have some idea about the 
issue under study and relies on one or more hypotheses.  Descriptive research is seen to be 
rigid and the question of “who, what when, where, why and how” must be clearly 
specified in the research. Descriptive research design is further classified into longitudinal 
which comprises true panel and omnibus panel and cross-sectional which involves sample 
survey (Churchill 1999).  
This study uses a pilot study survey of cocoa growers of Ghana. The advantage of 
using cross-sectional data is that it is collected at a single point in time and therefore less 
expensive than the use of longitudinal survey which involves conducting the survey over 
different time periods from the same respondents. The rationale for choosing the 
descriptive research design is because both research questions as well as hypotheses which 
had been specified earlier in chapter 4 are formulated beforehand; data is then collected by 
survey and appropriate statistical analyses are then conducted to test the hypotheses. The 
hypotheses are then supported or refuted. This then adds to theory development by the 
support of hypotheses which sheds lights on the phenomena the theory seeks to explain. 
Apart from the descriptive research design the two other types of research design 
are explorative research and casual research designs. An explorative research is concern 
with finding ideas and insights to generate possible reasons of a problem and it is use for 
the formation of problem for specific investigation whilst casual research mostly involves 
experiments and are undertaken to find the relationship between cause and effect 
(Churchill 1999).    
5.4 Empirical setting and Geographical Location of the study  
The Ghanaian cocoa industry is the empirical setting for this study. The study seeks 
to investigate some antecedents of suppliers’ perception of buyer opportunism and the 
contingent effect of transaction-specific supplier development on the influence of 
relational duration on buyer opportunism in buyer seller relationships. The cocoa industry 
 36 
of Ghana is a very important industry for the country; it serves as a major source of income 
to the country and provides employment to the millions of people involved in the various 
activities entailed in the supply, warehousing, transport, processing and export of the 
commodity.  
The empirical context for this study is the relationship between growers of cocoa 
(suppliers) and LBCs (buyers).  The industry is characterized by buyer control of the 
farmers by licensed buying companies (LBC’s). The focus of the study is buyer opportunism 
while the unit of analysis is the relationship between the smallholder farmers and the 
buying agents. The geographical location for the study is the Oda district of the eastern 
region of Ghana, it is the municipal capital of the Birim Central municipal district with a 
population of about 38, 000 inhabitants. The town lies along the hilly side of the rain forest 
in the Birim River basin.  
The structure of the cocoa sector is shown in figure 5.1 below. The main actors of 
interest to this study are the small holder farmers, the License Buying Companies (LBC’s) 
and the Ghana Cocoa board (COCOBOD). The activities of these actors are shown in the 
structure of the industry depicted in figure 5.1 below. 
Figure 5.1 Structure of the Cocoa Industry 
 
Source: Lundstedt and Parssinen (2009) 
5.4.1 Smallholder farmer 
 The cocoa sector has about 800,000 smallholder farmers who are the main 
upstream suppliers in the cocoa supply chain (Anin-Kwapong and Frimpong, 2004). 
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Farmers in Ghana are paid a guaranteed fixed price which is a minimum 70% of the 
projected free on board (FOB) price referred to as the producer price. The farmers 
therefore make the choice of which LBCs to sell to depending on prompt payment and the 
degree of trust that the farmer has in the LBCs agent so they try to avoid the less trust 
worthy ones (Vigneri and Santos, 2007). The granting of loan or credit and the subsidizing 
of input also play a role in the choice of which buyer to sell to.  
 According to (Opoku, 2012) the cocoa farmers are organized under the Ghana 
Cocoa, Coffee and Shea-nut farmers association (GCCSFA). The farmers benefit from the 
Ghana Cocoa Board in the form of fertilizers at subsidized prices, social amenities such as 
solar energy, bole holes for water, roads linking cocoa growing areas, housing schemes 
and the award of educational scholarships to their wards. They also depend on the License 
Buying companies for yearly cash bonus it pays (Opoku, 2012). On the contrary Lavan 
(2007) believes the Cocoa farmers in Ghana do not benefit much, they lack the 
organizational support for their power to negotiate, and also lack the bargaining power in 
relations to the state.   
5.4.2 Licensed buying companies (LBC’s)   
Licensed Buying companies are private business granted permission to partake in 
the internal marketing of cocoa in Ghana as part of the liberalization of the cocoa sector. 
Although LBCs have been granted permission to export the commodity and to sell some of 
their purchases to domestic processors, they can only do so through the COCOBOD. The 
introduction of private participation in the internal marketing of cocoa has brought in its 
wake some form of competition in the system. According to Varangis and Schreiber 
(2001), the competitive purchasing of cocoa in the internal markets of producing countries 
results in efficiency and higher producer prices to farmers. However, COCOBOD is the 
single largest buyer of the commodity from the LBCs for sale to both overseas customers 
and to some domestic processors. The LBC’s have been noted to cluster in the areas where 
a lot of cocoa farmers exist so that they can be able to buy from a few producers that 
produce on large scale (Vigneri and Santo 2007). Table 5.1 below shows LBC’s and their 
ranking by market share. 
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Table 5.1 LBC’s ranking by market share 
 
*Licensed withdrawn **Newly licensed LBC, ***Ongoing season 
Source: Lundstedt and Parssinen (2009) 
COCOBOD is the single largest buyer of the commodity from the LBCs for sale to 
both overseas customers and to some domestic processors. In a survey by Vigneri and 
Santos (2007) it was realized that 62% of the farmers in all the regions sold their products 
to the Produced Buying Company (PBC) the purchasing subsidiary of COCOBOD. 
According to Vigneri and Santos (2007), five LBCs dominate the entire market. They are: 
Produced Buying Company a former subsidiary of the COCOBOD; Kuapa Kokoo - a 
farmer based cooperative which works with Fair Trade; Adumapa, a Ghanaian owned 
company; OLAM - Singapore owned and Amajaro a UK owned business. However, the 
LBC’s ranking by Lundstedt and Parssinen (2009) showed a few of this five have been 
overtaken by other LBC’s in the LBC’s ranking by market share as shown in table 5.1 
above. 
5.4.3 The Ghana Cocoa Board 
Before the Ghana Cocoa Board was established, the West African Cocoa Control 
Board (WACCB) was established by the British Colonial Government in 1940 to 
purchased cocoa at a guaranteed price to farmers. Later the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing 
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Board (GCCMB) was created in 1947 through an ordinance No. 16 of 1947 to control the 
purchase of cocoa locally (Amoah, 1998; Glavee-Geo, 2012). The GCCMB become the 
sole authority that buys cocoa from farmers at stable producer prices. According to Amoah 
(1998) and Glavee-Geo (2012) several changes in title of the Board were made between 
1947 and 1984 until the Provisional National Defence Council Law 81 changed the title of 
the Board from Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (GCMB) to the current name Ghana Cocoa 
Board (COCOBOD) in 1984 (Amoah, 1998; Glavee-Geo, 2012). 
The functions of COCOBOD are performed by specialized divisions of the Board. 
They deal with things regarding production, quality control; internal and external 
marketing of cocoa; research and extension. The functions are categorized into two main 
sectors; pre-harvest and post-harvest. The Cocoa Research Institute (CRIG), the Seed 
Production Unit (SPU), and the Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus Disease Control Unit 
(CSSVDCU) perform the pre-harvest functions whilst the Quality Control Division (QCD) 
and the Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC) Limited are the division in charge of the post-
harvest functions. Their activity involves quality control measures of the farmers’ produce 
in order for it to be accepted at the buying centers by the Licensed Buying Companies 
(Amoah, 1998).  
COCOBOD is by far the largest purchaser of cocoa in Ghana and it still dominates 
the marketing system in Ghana with so much regulatory control and power at the 
downstream end of the supply chain. It determines the producer price to be paid to the 
farmers. 
5.5 Data Collection 
Data collection involves the collection of data either by primary and/or secondary 
data collection method. Both primary and secondary data was used in this study. Data 
collection by primary methods involve getting consent from respondents; justifying the 
need for the study as some respondents will like to know what the researcher will be using 
the information collected for; providing incentives, this helps in increasing response rates; 
maintaining confidentiality, the need to maintain confidentiality is very important as it is 
not ethical to collect information from people without their consent or without assuring 
them of confidentiality of the information provided. Secondary data collection may also 
involve seeking consent from sources especially if such information is not freely available 
for the public by electronic means or other means. It is important to state that the relevance 
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of the findings of this study to the welfare of the respondents especially with regards to 
buyer opportunism made it quite easy for the many respondents to accept to participate in 
this study.  
5.5.1 Primary and Secondary data 
Primary data was collected through a survey from seventy-three (73) respondent 
mostly small holder farmers in January, 2011. According to Malhotra and Birks (2006; 
p.41) primary data is data collected by the researcher to address a specific research 
question.  
Secondary data on the other hand is data not intended for the problem at hand at the 
time it was collected. It may be information already generated in an organization. They are 
available in such forms as books, journals, articles, databases and internet sources. The 
advantage of using secondary data is that it is economical and it saves time however it has 
the disadvantage of not fitting to the problem and they are not fully accurate (Churchill and 
Brown 2004). For the purpose of this study secondary data was sourced from the internet 
web pages of the International Cocoa Organization (ICCO) and the COCOBOD. Also a 
review of the literature from books, journal articles on related subject, past theses from the 
Himolde library Brage Him pages, online sources e.g. Science direct, ProQuest, BISSY 
database were also made use of to gain knowledge about the subject. 
5.5.2 Population, Sampling frame, Sample size and Sampling procedures 
A population is a total of the cases which are in conformity with the specifications 
of the required designation (Churchill and Brown 2004). The population for this study 
consists of all the 800,000 small holder cocoa farmers in the country. Malhotra and Birks 
(2006:357) defined a sample as “a subgroup of the elements of the population selected for 
participation in the study” and “a sampling frame as representation of the element that 
consists of a list or set of directions for identifying the target population” Malhotra and 
Birks (2006; p.359). The   sample frame was a list of cocoa growers (suppliers) within the 
Eastern region of Ghana and the sample was further narrowed down to small holder cocoa 
farmers in the geographical location of the Oda Township of the Akim Oda district.  The 
sample size was 120 smallholder farmers. 
A convenience sampling technique was used in the sampling procedure. It involves 
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the selection of respondent who happen to be around at the time the interviewer was 
visiting (Because it was a farming community and not all the farmers could be found at 
home at the time of visit). The use of convenience sampling makes it least expensive and 
less time consuming to obtain because the sampling units are accessible, easy to measure 
and they are cooperative (Malhotra and Birks 2006). Although convenience sampling was 
not recommended for descriptive research due to the problem of selection bias, it was 
allowed for the pre-testing of questionnaires and for pilot studies (Malhotra and Birks 
2006).  
5.5.3 Data collection techniques and procedures 
Data collection was done through cross sectional data survey. The data was 
collected by personal questionnaire administration through face to face interviews. 
According to Churchill (1999) a questionnaire can be administered by mail, telephone or 
by personal interviews. Face-to-face interviews using a structured questionnaire were 
done. Face-to-used interviews are very common method of data collection especially in 
research settings where the administration of questionnaires by mail are likely to result in 
very low response rate; and where facilities for such means are not well developed. 
Administrations by means of telephones are also not convenient within the research setting 
because a long questionnaire with many question items is likely to result in very low 
response rate. Secondly because it was impossible to use the other forms because of the 
nature of their job, they had no time for such conveniences. The researcher with the 
assistance of two research assistants visited the individual farmers with a questionnaire to 
have face-to-face interviews with the respondents. Hence the dataset for this study is based 
on the original pilot survey conducted by PhD student/researcher Mr. Glavee-Geo in 
January 2011. 
5.6 Measurement  
According to Kerlinger (1986) measurement is the assignment of numerals to 
objects according to rules. Adapted multi–item scales from previous research were used to 
measure the constructs. This is to ensure the operationalization of each of the constructs in 
the model. Theory plays very important role in the conceptualization of measurement since 
most variables in the social sciences are not observable hence the need for theory to help in 
conceptualizing and operationalizing unobserved constructs (De Vellis, 2003).  Poor 
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measurement is said to impose an absolute limit on the validity of conclusions that a 
researcher can draw from his or her studies. For this reason it is advised that it is important 
for a researcher to get the measurement part of the study to be conducted well from the 
initial beginning of the study so as to be able to draw better conclusion of the study (De 
Vellis, 2003). This study used adapted scales which have been used in other studies such 
that the validity and reliability of such scales have been unquestionable.   
5.6.1 Measurement Model 
Two types of measurement model have been used in inter-organizational studies to 
find the relationship between a set of latent constructs. These are the principal factor model 
also known as reflective model and the composite latent variable model which is also 
known as formative scales. These models involve the use of multiple indicators in 
measuring a phenomenon which is unobservable (Jarvis et al, 2003). 
The Principal factor model involves reflective scales and shows the direction of 
causality from the construct to measure. The measures of the reflective scales are expected 
to have internal consistency to ensure reliability. The meaning of the construct is not 
altered when an indicator is removed from the model and this type of model takes into 
account measurement error at the item level. This is in contrast to the composite variable 
model where the direction of causality is from the measure to the construct, and it does not 
require internal consistency but rather requires criterion reliability and it takes into account 
error at the construct level (Jarvis et al 2003). However there are also similarities in both 
models in that both scale scores do not adequately represent the construct which leads to 
inconsistency in the reflective model and biased estimates in composite variable model 
(Jarvis et al 2003). In this study all the constructs are operationalized as latent variables 
and all the variables were measured using reflective scale. 
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Figure 5.3 Measurement Models 
 
 
Source: Jarvis et al (2003:201)  
5.6.2 Measurement of the variables 
The guidelines proposed by De Vellis (2003) in developing measures for the latent 
constructs were followed in this study. De Vellis (2003) defines a scale as a measurement 
instrument which is joined together into a score, with the intention of revealing the level 
which are not easily observable but exist in theory. He proposed a guideline in scale 
development following eight steps similar to those proposed by Churchill (1979). This 
guideline is consistent with those used in previous works by (Burki, 2009; Mia and 
Mentzer, 2004). The most important step is the validity of the construct which is 
determined by the following steps: Specification of constructs; Item selection; Purification 
and Scale validation (Burki, 2009; Churchill 1979). 
In order to determine what was to be measured, an extensive literature search was 
conducted regarding opportunism in buyer seller relationship and an item pool was 
generated. After the items were review by an expert (supervisor) the items were 
administered in a survey as pilot study. The items were evaluated by means of an 
exploratory factor analysis in assessing the latent variable and those that revealed low 
loadings as well as those that exhibited cross loadings were eliminated in order to establish 
the reliability of the scales and validated for convergent and discriminant validity. The 
results of these assessments are reported in chapter 6.   
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5.7 Measurement Process 
In this section the various question items that make up the variable are listed. In 
this study there is only one dependent variable; buyer opportunism(OPPOR), four 
independent variables ; relationship duration (REDURA), buyer control (BUYCON), 
supplier satisfaction (SATIS), and transaction-specific supplier development (SUDEV). 
And three control variables namely sales volume (SALESVOL), relative power 
(REPOWER) and trust (TRUST). 
5.7.1 The Dependent Variable  
In this study Buyer Opportunism (OPPOR) is used as the dependent variable. To 
measure perceived buyer’s opportunism, the approach used in studies by Gundlach et al. 
(1995); Skarmeas et al (2002) and Provan and Skinner, (1989) were used as a guide. The 
construct consist of four items and are negatively worded and anchored from 1 strongly 
agree to 7 strongly disagree.  
OPPOR 1 This purchasing clerk has always not provided me with a completely 
truthful picture   of my sales transactions with their company 
OPPOR 2  The purchasing clerk was always insincere about the correct weighting of 
my cocoa 
OPPOR 3 This buying company always breaches formal or informal agreements 
concerning timely payment of cash bonuses to their benefits 
OPPOR 4 This purchasing clerk has benefited from our relationship to my detriment 
by undervaluing the weights of cocoa purchased from my farm. 
OPPOR 5 Sometimes this purchasing clerk lies to me about the quality of my cocoa 
beans in order to protect their interest 
OPPOR 6 This purchasing clerk has sometimes promised to correct errors concerning 
my sales transactions without actually doing that later. 
OPPOR 7 Sometimes this purchasing clerk alters the weighing scale slightly in order 
to get what they want 
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5.7.2 The Independent Variables 
Relationship duration (RUDURA) 
Relationship duration measured in years represents the number of years that a 
supplier has been selling to the buyer. This variable was adapted from Heide and Miner 
(1992).  The natural logarithm of the REDURA is used and it is measured by the single 
open question: How long have you been selling to this company? 
 
Buyer control (BUYCON) 
Buyer control (BUYCON) items were adapted from Buvik and Halskau (2001). 
BUYCON1 This buyer determines all aspect of quality assurance such as grading.  
BUYCON2 This buyer makes sure the quality of the cocoa I sell is ok before taking 
possession 
BUYCON3 This buyer takes control of the product for quality inspection 
BUYCON4 This buyer ensures that the quality test is passed 
BUYCON5 This buyer has more control of the quality of cocoa I sell to their company 
BUYCON6 This buyer always rejects poor quality cocoa sold to their company 
Supplier satisfaction (SATIS)  
Supplier satisfaction (SATIS) was adapted from Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000); 
Skinner et al. (1992); Crosby et al (1990) and Benton and Maloni (2005). The variables 
were 1 to 7 point scales anchored by “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”.  
 
SATIS1 My relationship with this buying company has been very beneficial for my 
farm business 
SATIS2 My relationship with this buying company is very attractive with respect to 
prompt payment of cash bonuses  
SATIS3 I am very pleased with my decision to sell to this buyer due to the financial 
benefits the company provides for my farm business 
SATIS4 I would recommend that other farmers sell their products to this buying 
company  
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SATIS5 I am very satisfied at the price at which I sell my cocoa to this buying 
company  
SATIS6 I have a favorable relationship with this buying company personnel 
SATIS7 I am satisfied with dealing with this buying company 
SATIS8 Would continue selling to this buying company always because of the good 
personal relationship I have with their staff 
SATIS9 This buying company is good to do business with 
SATIS10 I am pleased with dealing with this buying company always 
 
Supplier development (SUDEV) 
Supplier development (SUDEV) is measured by using a 7 point Likert scale where 
1 represents strongly disagree and 7 represent strongly agree, and is operationalized by the 
following four items adapted from Krause (1999) and Ghijsen et al. (2009). 
SUDEV1 This buying company personnel makes visits to help me improve on my 
performance 
SUDEV2 This buying company personnel frequently invites me to discuss issues for 
performance improvement with respect to grading of my cocoa beans 
SUDEV3 This buying company recognizes my farm business for 
achievements/performance in the form of awards 
SUDEV4 This buying company provides my farm business with training/education 
SUDEV5  This buying company provides my farm business with equipment or tools 
for improvement 
SUDEV6  This buying company provides my farm business with credit/capital 
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5.7.3 Control Variables 
In addition to the dependent and independent variables, three control variables: 
annual sales volume (SALEVOL) Relative power (REPOWER) and trust (TRUST) were 
included in the model.  
 
Annual sales volume (SALEVOL)  
The annual sales volume (SALEVOL) is measured as a single item scale adapted 
from a previous research by Heide and Miner (1992).  The sale volume was measured by 
the natural  logarithm of the total weight in bags of the produce sold to the buying firm and 
is measured by a single question: 
How much in terms of weight were you able to sell to this company during the last crop 
season…….. tons……..kg 
 
Relative power (REPOWER) 
Relative power is operationalized by the following two items adapted from Joshi 
and Stump (1999) and Andersen and Weitz (1989). 
REPOWER1 With respect to sales volume during the last twelve months, my farm 
business sales to this buying company as compared to what they buy from 
all other farmers is much smaller? 
REPOWER2 How large do you perceive cash bonuses paid by this buying company to 
your farm business as compared to what were paid to all other farmers? 
REPOWER3  How large do you perceive your dependency on this particular buying 
company compared to other buying companies within this district? 
REPOWER4  How much will it cost you in terms of transportation fare if you want to 
replace this buying company for another one in a new location? 
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Trust (TRUST) 
Trust (TRUST) is measure by a using a 7 point Likert scale where1 represents 
strongly disagree and 7 represent strongly agree, and is operationalized by the following 
seven items adapted from Moorman et al (1992); Morgan and Hunt (1994) and Ganesan 
(1994). 
TRUST1  I trust this purchasing clerk that I deal with because he ensures that my 
cocoa sales are weighed accurately 
TRUST2  I trust this purchasing clerk to sometimes do things on my behalf which I 
can’t do myself like ensuring that correct entries of my sales are done in 
their books 
TRUST3  In our relationship this purchasing clerk can always be trusted at all times to 
be very truthful about my sales transactions with their company 
TRUST4 In our relationship this purchasing clerk has high integrity concerning my 
business dealings with them 
TRUST5 In our relationship this purchasing clerk can be counted on to do what is 
right always 
TRUST6 This purchasing clerk is like a friend because of his truthfulness 
TRUST7  This purchasing clerk cares for me always by his high levels of accurate 
record keeping of my sales transactions with their company in my passbook 
 
5.8 Summary 
In this chapter the research methodology applied in the study was discussed. The 
philosophical position and the research design used in this study were discussed. The 
empirical setting including the geographical location, as well as the data collection 
methods employed were also presented. Also presented is the measurement of the 
variables and their question items. In the next chapter the measurement assessment and 
data validation will be presented. It is worthy of mention that the items that were used in 
the operationalization of the constructs were formulated and/or adapted scales by Richard 
Glavee-Geo under supervision of Professor Arnt Buvik (Glavee-Geo, 2012; Glavee-Geo 
and Buvik, 2012a; 2012b). 
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CHAPTER 6 
MEASUREMENTS ASSESSMENT AND DATA VALIDATION 
6.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, the research methodology of the study and the 
measurement of variables were discussed. In this chapter an explanation of the preliminary 
data assessment is presented. The chapter discusses data assessment in terms of data 
screening and cleaning; descriptive statistics and reliability of the various scale items as 
well as their factor loadings. The chapter ends with a discussion on the validation process 
of the various constructs/factors that forms the basis of data analysis in the next chapter.  
6.2 Data Screening and Cleaning 
According to Pallant (2007; p 43) before data is analyzed it is advised that the data 
is checked for errors since this may affect the results of the analysis.  The process of 
screening the data involves: 
Step 1: Checking for errors: By checking for values out of range within the possible 
scores. Such as mistakes made in data entering. 
Step 2: Finding and correcting the error in the data file: By locating exactly where the error 
can be found in the data file and rectifying or deleting the value (Pallant, 2007, p 43). 
In accordance with the recommendation, in this study the data set was checked for errors 
such as outliners but this was found to be non-existent. 
6.3 Descriptive Statistics 
According to Pallant (2007) it is advisable that data is initially subjected to a 
descriptive analysis before it is validated or use for any analysis. The statistics obtained 
can be used as a characterization of the sample, it can also be used to check whether any of 
the variables undermine the assumption of the intended statistical technique to be use in 
answering the research questions and also use in particular research questions. Descriptive 
statistic is defined by Gaur and Guar (2006) as numerical and graphical method used in the 
summary of data. They gave three numerical methods for descriptive statistic as the: 
Measurement of central tendency (mean, median, and mode) and normality; Measurement 
of variability (range and variance) and the Measurement of skewness and kurtosis (Gaur 
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and Guar, 2006). In this regard, descriptive statistic was run for the variables.  The items 
were checked for normality (Appendix 2a, 2b and 2c) and they were found to be 
acceptable in meeting the various assumptions of normality. This is important according to 
Hair et al. (1998) because when it is not normal it will compromise the results of the 
correlation and the factor analysis. The result of the descriptive statistics for all the 
variables in the research model and the sample characteristics of the study are presented in 
Table 6.1 and 6.2 shown below. It includes the minimum, maximum, mean and the 
standard deviations of the variables. However, the measure of normality is shown in the 
Appendix 2a, 2b and 2c. 
 
Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
 N Min. Max. Mean SD 
Sales volume 
 
73 4.14 8.02 6.01 7.83 
Buyer control 73 3.00 7.00 6.05 .76 
Trust 73 1.43 7.00 5.57 1.43 
Relative power 73 1.00 7.00 5.53 1.39 
Transaction specific supplier 
development 
73 1.50 6.75 4.54 1.46 
Buyer opportunism 73 1.00 7.00 3.78 1.46 
Relationship duration 73 -1.40 1.60 .00 .81 
 
Supplier satisfaction 73 -3.30 1.20 .00 1.04 
Supplier satisfaction 
*relationship duration 
73 -4.12 3.11 -.06 .86 
 
 
Table 6.2 Characteristics of the sample 
 N   Min. Max. Mean SD 
Relationship duration (years) 73 2.00 30.00 8.39 7.13 
Annual sales volume (Kg) 73 63.00 3050.00 555.31 525.25 
Farm size (Ha)  73 1.00 7.00 2.2 1.57 
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6.4 Scale Reliability 
In this section the reliability of the scales used in the study is discussed. Reliability 
is referred to by Kerlinger (1986; p.404-405) cited in Agle and Kelly (2001) as the 
accuracy or precision of a measuring instrument….. Synonyms to reliability are: 
dependability, stability, consistency, predictability and accuracy”. Thus it seeks to answer 
the questions does the measurement represent the true properties; should the research be 
conducted by new researcher with new variables will the same results be obtained? Agle 
and Kelly (2001). 
 Peter (1979) cited in Mentzer and Flint (1997) identified four types of reliability 
depending on the main intents of the research. It could either be test-retest; mostly used for 
the development of psychological constructs; split half reliability, where the sample is 
randomly divided into two half and the results from the two groups are correlated; internal 
consistency which is the commonest method used based in the determination of Cronbach 
Alpha; and inter-judge, commonly used in case study based research (Kimberin and 
Almut, 2008; Mentzer and Flint 1997).  
The scale reliability for each of the latent construct was assessed. This was done by 
first undertaking an exploratory factor analysis (EFA).  Exploratory factor analysis is one 
of the two types of factor analysis and the other type is confirmatory factor analysis.  
According to Pallant (2007; p179) factor analysis refers to data reduction technique 
whereby large sets of data are taken and a way is found for reducing that data into a 
smaller set of factors or components. She explained several different approaches used in 
the factor extraction, namely the principal component model; the principal factors; image 
factoring; maximum likelihood factoring; alpha factoring; unweighted least squares; and  
generalized least squares. In this study the principal component approach was adopted due 
to the fact that it is the commonest method use for factor extraction (Pallant, 2007). 
Tables 6.3 below shows the results of the Varimax rotated factor analysis carried 
out in this study. Six factors were identified namely factor1 Buyer opportunism, factor2 
represents buyer control (BUYCON), factor3 is trust (TRUST), factor4 is supplier 
satisfaction (SATIS), the factor5 is relative power (REPOWER) and factor6 is transaction-
specific supplier development (SUDEV). Items with factor loadings less than .40 
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(OPPOR1, OPPOR3, OPPOR7, REPOWER3, REPOWER4, SUDEV 5 and SUDEV6) were 
deleted and all cross loading items were also deleted. The result shows all the factor 
loading were between .519 and .866 (Table 6.3). High factor loading has been recognized 
to be a good indicator of high convergent validity (Hair et al, 1998). 
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Rotated Component Matrix Extracted Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotated Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
Rotation converged in 8 iterations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 Factor analysis 
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 The Cronbach alpha of each factor is used in assessing the internal consistency in 
this study. This is due to the fact that it is a very important indicator of reliability and 
without it the other tests will have no meaning (Mentzer and Flint, 1997). The Cronbach 
alpha is used to compare how well each of the questions in a questionnaire correlates with 
the other questions measuring the construct. It is seen as an average correlation of one 
question to the rest in the group. A low Cronbach alpha shows that the sample poorly 
captures the construct used for measurement (Nunnally, 1967). It is therefore advised that 
the construct should have at least three question items to establish reliability since the 
greater the number of items the higher the Cronbach alpha will be and this will improve 
the measurements reliability and precision (Mentzer and Flint, 1997). The coefficient of 
Cronbach alphas of the constructs shown in Table 6.4 below indicates that all the 
measurement items forming a construct/factor have internal consistent reliability greater 
than .70 as recommended by Nunnally (1967) with buyer opportunism (OPPOR) having 
the least with α =.67. 
Table 6.4 Reliability 
 
Construct Items No. 
of 
 Items 
Reliability  
(Cronbach 
alpha) α 
Buyer opportunism OPPOR 2, 4,5 6 4 .67 
Buyer control BUYCON 1,2,3,4,5,6 6 .84 
Trust TRUST 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 7 .95 
Supplier satisfaction SATIS 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9.10  10 .89 
Relative power REPOWER 1,2 2 .80 
Transaction-specific supplier 
development 
SUDEV 1,2,3,4 4 .71 
 
6.5 Validity 
Validity has been explained to refer to the degree that what we think we have 
measured has been measured by our measures. They deal with the degree that our 
measurement adequately represents our constructs theoretically (Kerlinger, 1986). Agle 
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and Kelley (2001) classified validity into different type’s notably content validity, face 
validity, criterion- related validity, convergent validity, discriminant validity and 
constructs validity.  
Content validity and Face validity have been considered as the same by some 
authors (Buvik 2011; Mentzer and Flint, 1997; Ping Jr., 2004). It refers to the validation by 
expert in a field of study on measures they have encountered (Agle and Kelley, 2001).  
According to Churchill (1979) if a sample’s item “looks right” then face or content validity 
has been achieved. It shows the completeness with which the area of the characteristic is 
captured by the measure (Buvik, 2011). Criterion validity also known as predictive validity 
refers to the validity that is based on some measures criteria which is supposed to measure 
the item been studied (Agle and Kelley, 2001). It shows the usefulness of the measure as a 
predictor of some other characteristic or character (Buvik, 2011). Thus it provide evidence 
on how well a developed measure correlates with other measures of  a similar construct or 
the same construct Kimberlin and Almut (2008).  
6.5.1 Construct Validity 
Construct validity involves the use of different types of validity to address the issue 
of how well we define and measure the theoretical issues in our study (Mentzer and Flint 
1997). Construct Validity refers to the degree to which a measured construct is equal to the 
construct that is been measured (Agle and Kelley, 2001).  
6.5.2 Convergent validity 
In this study convergent validity and discriminant validity were considered.  This is 
due to the fact that the assessment of construct validity is mostly supported by convergent 
validity and discriminant validity Dunn et al. (1994). Convergent validity refers to the 
degree to which there is agreement between different data sources and measurement 
methods on a construct been assessed. The existence of such agreement makes the 
construct to be considered valid (Agle and Kelley 2001). 
  A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) based on AMOS18 (Arbuckle, 2009) was 
used to assess the convergent validity of the constructs. A one factor validation was used 
for the items in each construct. Relationship duration (REDURA) and Sales volume 
(SALESVOL) are single item measures for this reason they were not assessed for validity 
as they are assumed to fully measure the construct they are supposed to measure. There 
was also no calculation for fit estimate for Relative Power (REPOWER), although a multi 
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item since a two item scale would give a trivial fit (Buvik, 2002). The model was 
evaluated using different goodness of fit indicators such as: the Chi square test results, 
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR), Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and Root Mean Error of Approximation (RMSEA).  
The results from the fit statistics of the various constructs in the model are shown 
in Table 6.5 below. The fit statistic showed trust (TRUST) and buyer control (BUYCON) 
gave adequate fit with high significant loading found to give good convergent validity.  
Some of the items of the other constructs had insignificant factor loadings though the 
overall model fit indicates adequate fit. For example buyer opportunism OPPOR (χ2 (2) 
=4.28; P=0.12; GFI=0.97; CFI=0.97; TLI=0.90; RMSEA=0.13 RMR=0.23) had adequate 
fit though an item Oppor4 had an insignificant loading (λ12=.13 with t-value 1.01). 
Transaction-specific supplier development SUDEV (χ2 (2) =15.93; P=0.00; GFI=0.92; 
CFI=0.83; TLI=0.50; RMSEA=0.31 RMR=0.47). These did not meet the cutoff criteria 
recommended by Schreiber et al1. (2006). 
                                                 
1
 The recommended cutoff criteria for fit indexes according to Schreiber et al (2006) are: Chi square test 
results, ratio of χ2 to d.f ≤ 2or 3 ; Root Mean Square Residual (RMR), the smaller the better 0 indicates a 
perfect fit; Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), ≥ .95; Comparative Fit Index (CFI), ≥ .95 ; Tucker-Lewis Index 
(TLI) ≥ .95 but can be 0 > TLI > 1 for acceptance and Root Mean Error of Approximation (RMSEA) < .06 to 
.08 with confidence interval. 
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Table 6.5 Assessment of Construct Validity 
Scale Standardized 
loading (t-values) 
Fit indices Reliability 
Cronbach 
alpha 
OPPOR (4  items) 
Buyer Opportunism 
λ11=0.50 
a 
λ12=0.13 (1.01) 
λ13=0.86 (7.03) 
λ14=0.84(6.92) 
 
χ2(2)=4.28 
P=0.12 
GFI=0.97 
CFI=0.97 
TLI=0.90 
RMSEA=0.13 
RMR=0.23 
 
0.67 
BUYCON (6 items) 
Buyer Control 
λ21=0.70
a 
λ22=0.70(4.90) 
λ23=0.89 (4,96) 
λ24=0.68 (4.80) 
λ25=0.51 (3.86) 
λ26=0.61 (4.45) 
χ2(7)=9.99 
P=0.19 
GFI=0.96 
CFI=0.98 
TLI=0.96 
RMSEA=.08 
RMR=0.05 
 
0.84 
SATIS (10 items) 
Supplier Satisfaction 
λ 31=0.25
a 
λ 32=0.48 (1.93) 
λ 33=0.58 (2.01) 
λ 34=0.68 (2.06) 
λ 35=0.51(1.96) 
λ 36=0.67(2.41) 
λ 37=0.84 (2.11) 
λ38=0.74(2.08) 
λ39=0.89(2,12) 
λ310=0.92 (2,13) 
 
χ2(30)=43,73 
P=0.05 
GFI=0.88 
CFI=0.97 
TLI=0.950 
RMSEA=0.08 
RMR=0.06 
 
0.89 
SUDEV (4 items) 
Transaction specific 
Supplier 
Development 
λ 41=1.09
a 
λ 42=0.65(3.71) 
λ 43=0.30 (2.30) 
λ 44=0.37 (2.67) 
 
χ2(2)=15.93 
P=0.00 
GFI=0.92 
CFI=0.83 
TLI=0.50 
RMSEA=0.31 
RMR=0.47 
0.71 
TRUST (7 items) 
Trust 
λ 51=0.79
a
  
λ52=0.83(7.84) 
λ53=0.84(7.97) 
λ54=0.87(8.34) 
λ55=0.87(8.37) 
λ56=0.82 (7.78) 
λ57=0.85(8.12) 
χ2(12)=10.34 
P=0.50 
GFI=0.96 
CFI=1.00 
TLI=1.01 
RMSEA=0.00 
RMR=0.06 
 
0.95 
 
a
 Standardized estimated factor loading  
 58 
6.5.3 Discriminant Validity 
Discriminant Validity according to Fornell and Larker (1989) refers to the degree 
to which a latent variable discriminates from other latent variables.  It is the ability of an 
individual to able to differentiate the construct been studied from similar ones (Agle and 
Kelley 2001) so that the measure does not correlate highly to others that it is supposed to 
be different from. When assessing discriminant validity the latent variable should be able 
to account for more variance in the variable been observed to be related to it than a) the 
measurement error or similar unmeasured influences; or b) other construct existing within 
the conceptual framework. The absence of these renders the validity of the indicators and 
constructs questionable (Farrell et al, 2008; Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Discriminant 
validity was assessed using the Average Variance Extracted versus Shared Variance Test 
method presented by Fornell and Larcker (1981). Here the average variance extracted 
(AVE) of the construct is compared with the shared variance amongst the constructs. 
Discriminant validity is said to be achieved if the AVE for each construct is found to be 
greater than the shared variance (i.e., the squared correlation) between the construct (ibid). 
The resultant estimates are shown in Table 6.6 below. 
Table 6.6 Discriminant validity: squared inter construct correlation (R
2
) and variance 
extracted estimates (AVE) 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1Buyer opportunism 1 .00 .00 .00 .14 .02 .02 .14 .06 
2Relationship duration  1 .15 .01 .00 .00 .03 .03 .01 
3 Sales volume  1 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
4Buyer control    1 .14 .12 .00 .07 .00 
5 Trust     1 .53 .00 .19 .03 
6Supplier satisfaction      1 .00 .10 .00 
7 Relative power      1 .02 .02 
8Supplier development        1 .00 
9Supplier satisfaction*Relationship duration       1 
AVE .28 - - .30 .50 .28 - .41 - 
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Based on the above method the results of the AVE supports discriminant validity 
for the constructs OPPOR, BUYCON and SUDEV who’s AVE were greater than their 
shared variance.  The construct TRUST and SATIS had shared variance (.53) greater than 
their respective AVE (.50; .28) thus discriminant validity was not supported for them. It is 
possible that for a small sample size (n=73) as used in this study and the stringent method 
of assessing discriminant validity according to Fornell and Larcker (1981) and Farrell et al 
(2008) as applied in this study might not have been applicable or appropriate. 
6.6 Summary 
In this chapter the preliminary assessment of the data was presented. This chapter 
discussed data screening and cleaning, descriptive statistics and sample characteristics. 
The reliability and validity of the measurements of variables used in the study were also 
discussed. The scale reliability was assessed using the Cronbach’s alpha and the validity 
was assessed by the means of the various items factor loadings and Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE). In the next chapter the data is analyzed and the hypotheses tested based 
on the theory.
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CHAPTER 7 
DATA ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
7.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter the data screening and cleaning; the descriptive statistics; 
reliability and the validity of the various scale items were discussed. In this chapter we 
present the model estimation, estimation results, empirical testing of hypotheses and 
results found in the study. 
7.2 Regression Model   
The regression model that was applied in this study used the Ordinal Least Square 
(OLS) estimation technique. All the variables were included in the regression model. The 
model looks as follows: 
 
OPPOR= b 0 + b1 REDURA + b2 SALESVOL + b3 BUYCON + b4 TRUST + 
b5SATIS + b6 REPOWER + b7 SUDEV +b 8 SATIS*REDURA + έ 
                              ------- (1) 
 
In order to assess the interaction term included in the model, a new model was derived by 
taking a partial derivative of BUYCON with respect to REDURA to give: 
 
δ OPPOR/ δ REDURA = b 1+ b 8 (SATIS) 
           ------ (2) 
 
Where: 
Dependent Variable: 
OPPOR Buyer opportunism 
 
 Independent Variables: 
REDURA Relationship Duration (The natural logarithm of relationship 
duration)  
BUYCON Buyer Control 
SATIS  Supplier Satisfaction 
SUDEV Transaction Specific Supplier Development 
 61 
 
  
Control variables: 
SALEVOL Sales Volume (The natural logarithm of annual sales) 
TRUST Trust 
REPOWER Relative Power 
 
Interaction effect: 
 REDURA*SATIS Relationship duration*Supplier satisfaction 
7.3 Estimation results 
7.3.1 Correlation matrix 
The correlation matrix presented in Table 7.1 shows results from the correlation 
analysis (Appendix 4) and the corresponding means and standard deviations. The obtained 
result shows trust (TRUST), supplier satisfaction (SATIS), transaction-specific supplier 
development (SUDEV) and the interaction effect are significantly related to buyer 
opportunism (OPPOR). 
Table 7.1 Correlation matrix  
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 OPPOR 1 -.08 .07 .06 -.37
**
 -.39
**
 -.15 -.37
**
 -.24
*
 
2 REDURA  1 .39
**
 .09 .02 -.07 -.17 -.15 -.09 
3 SALESVOL 1 .03 -.09 -.09 -.05 -.09 -.03 
4 BUYCON  1 .38
**
 .34
**
 -.04 -.26
*
 .09 
5 TRUST   1 -.73
**
 -.06 -.44
**
 -.16 
6 SATIS    1 .01 -.32
**
 .07 
7 REPOWER     1 .13 .14 
8 SUDEV      1 .04 
9 SATIS*REDURA       1 
Mean 3.78       0.00  6.00 6.05 5.57 0.00 5.53 4.54 -.06 
SD 1.46         .81   .78   .76 1.43 1.04 1.39 1.46 .86 
** Correlation significant at the.01level (2-tail)  
*Correlation significant at the .05 level (2-tail)  
Values for REDURA and SATIS are mean centered   
7.3.2 Regression analysis 
Results from the hierarchical multiple regression analysis technique is shown in 
Table 7.2 and 7.3 below. The analysis in table 7.2 includes both the independent variables 
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and the control variables (Model 1) whilst the analysis in table 7.3 includes in addition to 
the independent variables and the control variables the interaction term (Model 2). Tables 
7.2 and 7.3 also include values of Tolerance and the Variance inflation factor (VIF) which 
was used in assessing multicollinearity. The result indicates there was no high 
intercorrelations between the independent variables since all the tolerance value were 
greater than .10. A VIF value of 10 or above is also an indicator of the existence of 
multicollinearity (Pallant, 2007). The individual VIF also indicates the variables in this 
study are not highly correlated.  
Table 7.2 Regression analysis: Dependent variable Buyer opportunism 
Hierarchical 
Regression 
Model 
Independent variables Unstandardized 
coefficients 
t-value Tolerance 
(VIF) 
Model 1 Constant b0 5.02   2.66***  
 REDURA b1  -.35  -1.66** .76 (1.32) 
 SALESVOL b2   .13     .61 .83 (1.21) 
 BUYCON b3   .59   2.76*** .81 (1.23) 
 TRUST b4  -.10    -.56 .40 (2.53) 
R
2
 =.33 SATIS b5 
REPOWER b6 
SUDEV b7                                      
 -.47 
 -.05 
-.31 
 -2.22** 
   -.48 
 -2.67*** 
.45 (2.23) 
.92 (1.09) 
.74 (1.35) 
R
2
adj=.26 F (7, 65) = 4.54 p<.001 Values for REDURA and SATIS are mean centered scores    
**p<.05  t- values greater than 1.64 are significant at 0.05 one tail 
***p<.01 t-values greater than 2.33 are significant at 0.01 one tail 
 
 
An overall assessment of the goodness of fit model 1 show model fit based on the 
t- value from the ANOVA in (appendix 5a) and this was found to be statistically 
significant at p<.001, (t = 2.66, p<.001, R
2
= 0.33 R
2
adj=0.26, F= 4.54). An interpretation of 
the R
2
adj=0.26 means that 26% of the variance in the buyer opportunism  (OPPOR) 
construct is explained by the independent variables in the model whilst the remaining 
percent of the explanation is done by other non-included variables. The coefficient of 
multiple determination known as R
2
 refers to the degree of variation of the dependent 
variable explained by the covariance of the independent variables (Churchill and Brown, 
2004). Thus R
2
=0.33 means 33% of the variation in the dependent variable buyer 
opportunism (OPPOR) is explained by the variation in the independent variables 
relationship duration (REDURA), supplier satisfaction (SATIS),  buyer control 
(BUYCON) and transaction specific supplier development (SUDEV). 
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Table 7.3 Regression analysis: Dependent variable Buyer opportunism 
Hierarchical 
Regression 
Model 
Independent variables Unstandardized 
coefficients 
t-value Tolerance 
(VIF) 
Model 2 Constant b0 4.08   2.25**  
 REDURA b1  -.41  -2.03** .75 (1.33) 
 SALESVOL b2   .13     .66 .83 (1.21) 
 BUYCON b3   .69   3.33*** .80 (1.26) 
 TRUST b4  -.26    -1.55* .35 (2.85) 
R
2
 =.41 SATIS b5 
REPOWER b6 
SUDEV b7    
SATIS*REDURA b8                                  
 -.32 
   .01 
  -.29 
-.52
  -1.51* 
     .06 
  -2.61*** 
  -2.95*** 
.42 (2.39) 
.89 (1.13) 
.74 (1.35) 
.84 (1.19) 
R
2
adj=.34 F (8, 64) = 5.53 p<.001 Values for REDURA and SATIS are mean centered scores    
*p<.10  t- values greater than 1.35 are significant at 0.10 one tail 
**p<.05  t- values greater than 1.64 are significant at 0.05 one tail 
***p<.01 t-values greater than 2.33 are significant at 0.01 one tail 
 
 
An overall assessment of model 2 shows the model is significant based on the t-
value found in the ANOVA output in (Appendix 5b) at p<.001, (t = 2.25, p<.05, R
2
= 0.41 
R
2
adj=0.34, F= 5.53).  A comparison of the two models shows that R
2
 =0.33 for model 
1(consisting of control variables and main effects) increased to R
2
 =0.41 for model 2 (with 
the addition of interaction effect SATIS* REDURA). The increment in the change in R
2 
by 
introducing the interaction effect was 0.08. An F-test was conducted to evaluate the 
significance of its F-value (Buvik, 2002; Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). This was 8.69 (F(1, 
64)=8.69 p < 0.05) i.e. 8.69 > 3.84 so interactive model 2 is significant.  
 
From the regression model 2 (Table 7.3) the estimates were extracted and inserted into 
equation 1 to give: 
 
OPPOR = 4.08 – 0.41REDURA + 0.13SALESVOL + 0.69BUYCON – 0.26TRUST – 
0.32SATIS + 0.01REPOWER - 0.29 SUDEV – 0.52SATIS * REDURA+ έ 
 
The regression model (Table 7.3) shows the association between the dependent 
variable, buyer opportunism (OPPOR); the independent variables relationship duration 
(REDURA), buyer control (BUYCON) supplier satisfaction (SATIS), transaction specific 
supplier development (SUDEV); the control variables sales volume (SALESVOL), 
relative power (REPOWER) and trust (TRUST) and the interaction  effect of relationship 
duration and satisfaction (REDURA*SATIS). 
The β coefficient is used in interpreting the regression model. The β coefficient of 
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the various independent variables (predictor variables) is interpreted to mean the average 
change in the particular predictor variable when all other predictor variables are held 
constant. 
The statistics from table 7.3 shows that relationship duration (REDURA) is 
negatively associated with buyer opportunism (OPPOR) at the significant level of p<.05; 
with b1 = -.41 and t= -2.03. This means that as the level of relationship duration increase 
by one unit whilst the other variables remain unchanged buyer opportunism decrease by -
2.03units. The estimation shows the relationship is significant. 
The path coefficients of sales volume (SALESVOL) b2=.13; t=.66 and relative 
power (REPOWER) with b6=.01; t=.06 are both positively associated with buyer 
opportunism (OPPOR) but these relationships are not significant. 
Buyer control (BUYCON) is positively associated with buyer opportunism 
(OPPOR) at the significant level of p<.01; with b3 = .69 and t= 3.33. This means that if the 
level of buyer control increase by one unit, all other variables held constant, buyer 
opportunism will increase by 3.33 units. This relationship is significantly enforced. 
 
The path coefficient of trust (TRUST) b4=-.26; t=-1.55 is negatively associated 
with buyer opportunism (OPPOR) but this relationship is only significant at the level 
p<.10. Supplier satisfaction (SATIS) is also negatively associated with buyer opportunism 
(OPPOR) with b5 = -.32 and t=-1.51. Meaning, an increase in the level of supplier 
satisfaction by one unit, whiles the other variables remain unchanged, buyer opportunism 
(OPPOR) will decrease by -.32. This relationship is also only significant at the level of 
p<.10. 
Transaction-specific supplier development (SEDEV) is also negatively associated 
with buyer opportunism (OPPOR) with b7 = -.29; and t=-2.61. This means that, as the level 
of transaction-specific supplier development increase by one unit, whiles the other 
variables stay the same buyer opportunism (OPPOR) will decrease by -.29. This 
relationship is also very significant at the level of p<.01. 
The interaction effect of relationship duration and satisfaction (REDURA*SATIS) 
is shown by first taking the partial derivative of buyer opportunism (OPPOR) with respect 
to the effect of relationship duration (REDURA). The relationship derived is presented as: 
 
δ OPPOR/ δ REDURA = β 1+ β 8 (SATIS) 
By inserting the values from the regression output we obtain: 
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δ OPPOR / δ REDURA = -0.41- 0.52 (SATIS) 
 
The interaction effect of relationship duration and buyer opportunism is shown 
graphically in Figure 7.1 below. It shows the plot of the partial derivative of buyer 
opportunism (OPPOR) with respect to relationship duration (REDURA) over the range of 
supplier satisfaction (SATIS). For low levels of SATIS increases in REDURA have a 
positive effect on buyer opportunism (OPPOR). Specifically, REDURA has a positive 
effect on OPPOR in the SATIS range below -.78 and a negative effect when SATIS is 
greater than -.78.  
 
Figure 7.1 The effect of relationship duration (REDURA) on buyer opportunism (OPPOR) 
for different levels of supplier satisfaction 
 
 
 
 
7.4 Test of hypotheses 
In Chapter 4, four hypotheses were presented. This was tested by using the 
statistical results from the SPSS regression estimates. The four hypotheses are: 
H1:   There is a positive association between buyer control and buyer opportunism 
H2:  There is a negative association between opportunism and supplier satisfaction. 
H3: There is a negative association between transaction-specific supplier        
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development   and buyer opportunism. 
             In addition to these main effects one other hypothesis was hypothesized. The 
variables for the main effect were mean centered as recommended by Cronbach (1987) 
before they were used for the testing in order to prevent the problem of multicollinearity. 
The variables mean centered are Relationship duration (REDURA) and satisfaction 
(SATIS). The hypothesized interaction effect is: 
H4: Under conditions of high supplier satisfaction, there is a stronger negative 
association between relationship duration and buyer opportunism than under 
low/moderate supplier satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 1 
A look at the statistics (b3= .69, t=3.33, p<.01) shows a positive association 
between buyer opportunism (OPPOR) and buyer control (BUYCON) as suggested (Table 
7.3). This shows that Hypothesis 1 is supported by the estimates of the statistical 
regression and it is significant. 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 is supported by the statistical results from the regression estimates (b5 
= -.32, t=-1.51, p<.10). A negative association was hypothesized between buyer 
opportunism (OPPOR) and supplier satisfaction (SATIS) and this was supported. 
 Hypothesis 3 
The statistical results presented support the hypothesis. A significant negative 
association is observed between buyer opportunism (OPPOR) and transaction-specific 
supplier development (SUDEV) as hypothesized. The estimate is summarized as (b7= -.29, 
t=-2.61, p<.01). 
Hypothesis 4 
The result of the regression analysis in model 2 supports this hypothesis. A look at 
the model shows it is significant at F = 4.54 at p<.001.  From the equation of the partial 
derivative of buyer opportunism with respect to relationship duration, the coefficient of the 
interaction term b8 = -.52 is greater than 0 and the t-value of -2.95 shows that the 
interaction is significant at p<.01. 
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7.5 Summary of hypotheses test 
Table 7.4 below presents the summary of the hypothesized effects and the findings.  
The results show that all four hypotheses were supported significantly. 
 
Table 7.4 Summary result of hypotheses 
Hypotheses Association between variables Hypothesized 
effect 
Findings 
H1 Buyer control and Buyer opportunism 
 
+*** Supported 
H2 Supplier satisfaction and Buyer 
opportunism 
 
-* Supported 
H3 Transaction-specific supplier development 
and Buyer opportunism. 
 
-*** Supported 
H4 Under conditions of high supplier 
satisfaction, there is a stronger negative 
association between relationship duration 
and buyer opportunism than under low 
supplier satisfaction 
-*** Supported 
*p<.10  t- values greater than 1.35 are significant at 0.10 one tail 
**p<.05  t- values greater than 1.64 are significant at 0.05 one tail 
***p<.01 t-values greater than 2.33 are significant at 0.01 one tail 
 
7.6 Summary 
The chapter discussed the analysis of the empirical data using multiple regression 
technique. The hypotheses were tested based on the results of the ordinary least square 
estimation technique (OLS). The findings show that all four hypotheses were supported 
significantly. In the final chapter the statistical results are further discussed and its 
implication for theory, limitation and further research are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION 
AND LIMITATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the empirical tests and results found in the study were 
discussed. That included the estimation of the model; the estimation result and the testing 
of the hypotheses in the study. This chapter presents the conclusion of the study, which 
begins with a summary of the study, followed by the discussion, the implications and 
suggestions for further research, as well as the limitations of the study. 
8.2 Summary of findings 
The aim of this study was to find out the key factors that influence buyer 
opportunism and also to elucidate on the key issues that can be taken into consideration for 
policy and management practice especially within the cocoa sector of Ghana using the 
relationship between a buyer and supplier as the unit of analysis.  The second purpose is to 
contribute to theory as most studies on opportunism has been done from the perspective of 
buyers. This study takes a different approach by integrating transaction cost and relational 
contract theory and using the relationship between a buyer and supplier as the unit of 
analysis.  
The result obtained from the correlation matrix shows trust, supplier satisfaction, 
transaction specific supplier development and the interaction effect are significantly 
related to buyer opportunism. An overall assessment of model 2 shows the model is 
significant based on the t-value found in the ANOVA output in (Appendix 5b) at t=2.25, 
(F (8, 64) = 4.54, p<.05, R2= 0.41, R2adj=0.34, F= 5.53). Thus R
2
=0.41 means 41% of the 
variation in the dependent variable buyer opportunism is explained by the independent 
variables in the model whilst the remaining percent of the explanation is done by other 
non-included variables. 
The empirical results supported our hypothesis1 based on Transaction cost theory. 
The hypothesized association between buyer opportunism and Buyer control is positive 
and significant. Hypothesis 2 which states a negative association between Buyer 
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opportunism and Supplier satisfaction was found to be significant and of the right sign, 
that is a negative association. Hence perceived buyer opportunism reduces supplier 
satisfaction. This is consistent with the findings of Gassenheimer et al (1996) and Cronso 
and Dahlstrom (2010) where opportunism was found to reduce satisfaction. Buyer 
opportunism and Transaction-specific supplier development (hypothesis 3) was also found 
to be significant and negatively associated. In the fourth hypothesis the model is expanded 
to include the interaction terms between relationship duration and supplier satisfaction, 
(REDURA* SATIS). When tested the interaction terms was found to be negatively 
associated with the dependent variable buyer opportunism and highly significant (t= -2.95, 
p= <.01). 
This research sought to find answers to a set of research questions of which the first 
research question was “what key factors influence buyer opportunism as perceived by the 
supplier?” The findings from this study suggest that the exercise of control by buying 
firms and their purchasing agents is perceived by suppliers as a means by which they the 
suppliers can be taken advantage of by the buying agents. This is because a partner who 
has the power to control another can sometimes abuse the relationship to his/her 
advantage. Hence most cocoa growers see this controlling behavior of the purchasing 
agents as an opportunity to be exploited to their disadvantage by the buying firms.  
Supplier dissatisfaction is one other important factor that has been identified to influence 
buyer opportunism. Suppliers who are not pleased with relationship outcomes in terms of 
the economic and or the social aspect of the relationship perceive buyers as being 
opportunistic.  
Hence dissatisfaction of a partner in a relationship can be cited as one of the many 
reasons why one partner may see the other as being opportunistic. Cocoa growers who are 
not satisfied with their relationship with buying companies and their agents especially in 
terms of economic outcomes are likely to perceive these firms and their agents as being 
opportunistic. Recent media publication in the Ghanaian press where some cocoa growers 
complained of being cheated by buying agents with respect to undervaluation of their sales 
attest to this assertion.  
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Supplier development is one other factor that has been identified to have an 
influence on buyer opportunism. Transaction-specific supplier development particularly 
reduces perceived buyer opportunism. Suppliers therefore perceive buyers who invest in 
them as been less opportunistic. They see such investment as goodwill from the buying 
firms as such good intensions can only be coming from people who wants the best for 
them and their farm business.  Buyer’s investment in transaction specific-supplier 
development gives the buyer the mandate to safeguard its investment and this makes the 
suppliers to perceive the buyers as less opportunistic. 
 The second research question under what condition does a supplier’s prior 
relationship with an exchange partner reduces buyer opportunism? A supplier’s prior 
relationship with an exchange partner reduces perceived buyer opportunism under 
conditions of high supplier satisfaction, where there is a stronger negative association 
between relationship duration and buyer opportunism than under low/moderate supplier 
satisfaction. 
8.3 Discussion 
According to transaction cost analysis (TCA) the presence of specific assets creates 
the need for specialize governance structure by allowing the buyer to safeguard his assets 
or investment. This necessitates buyer control of supplier decision in the form of quality 
consideration and the determination of who get credits and other forms of assistance. In 
transaction cost theory, specific assets lead to the problem of safeguarding. It is therefore 
seen in this light that the buyer specific investment in supplier significantly increases the 
control the buying firm exercises over the decision of the supplier. Power and control goes 
hand-in-hand.  
There is an imbalance of power between small holder cocoa supplier and their 
trading partners as seen from the comparison of their respective turnovers. Buying firms in 
the cocoa industry of Ghana are noted to have more relative power than cocoa growers 
(Vigneri and Santos, 2007). Buying firms turnover in terms of purchases form cocoa 
suppliers is relatively larger than sales from individual cocoa suppliers. Hence, the relative 
power of the buyer firms compared to that of individual small holder farmers is huge this 
makes them to exercise decision control over the suppliers. The exercise of this decision 
control makes the suppliers to think that they behave opportunistically. There is therefore 
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the need for suppliers to see buyers as not been opportunistic due to the power imbalance 
that exists between them but as partners in the buyer seller relationship.  
Another contributory factor to the perceived buyer opportunism is due to 
vulnerability which may be due to either information asymmetry or a lock-in situation 
(Wathne and Heide, 2000). The latter is more appropriate to the situation of cocoa 
suppliers in Ghana. Buying companies (LBC’s) are located in the supplier’s community 
and an unsatisfied supplier would have to transport his/her cocoa to another nearby 
community in order to sell to alternative buyers though there may be other buying firm 
representatives in the same locality. This may prove to be difficult due to the switching 
cost associated with such a move which adds to the transaction cost and thereby reducing 
income. 
In Transaction cost analysis (TCA) the presence of specific assets creates the need 
for specialize governance structure by allowing the buyer to safeguard his assets or 
investment. This necessitates buyer control of supplier decision in the form of quality 
consideration and relationship administration. However, buying firms investing in cocoa 
growers through transaction-specific supplier development initiatives in the form of 
dedicated assets such as the provision of equipment, tools; “soft” loans or capital; training 
and recognition of achievement in terms of awards for example “best farmer” are seen by 
the cocoa growers herein the suppliers as efforts that are geared towards improving their 
performance (Glavee-Geo and Buvik, 2012a). Such investments by the buying firms 
necessitate some form of control by the firm over the supplier not only as a safeguard for 
dedicated assets employed but more also as a means of channel management.  
It is also argued that because buying firms invest in the suppliers, the expectation 
of normative behavior by both partners in the relationships makes the suppliers perceive 
the buyers as being less opportunistic. Cocoa growers who are the suppliers in such 
relational exchanges therefore perceive the buying firms and their purchasing agents as 
being less opportunistic. The deployment of transaction-specific supplier development can 
therefore be suggested to lead to some norm development and friendships which can 
influence the way one partner perceive the other as this study seems to suggest. Cocoa 
growers who receive some form of intervention (dedicated transaction-specific assets) 
from their exchange partners perceive these partners as being less opportunistic than those 
who did not receive any form of intervention form their partners.  Hence the negative 
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influence of supplier development on perceived buyer opportunism as supported by this 
study.  
The availability of supplier development initiatives by buyers contribute to 
enhancing the buyer seller relationship. These factors contribute to enhancing the 
economic as well as the social aspect of the relationship through the development of the 
friendships after repeated exchanges. Satisfactory buyer-seller relationships between 
suppliers of cocoa and the buyers then translate into improved buyer seller relationship 
(Glavee-Geo and Buvik 2012b). Satisfaction, trust and commitment have been identified 
as important aspects of a quality relationship (Ivens, 2004). Thus for satisfactory buyer 
seller relationships between buyers and suppliers, an assessment of the two main effect of 
a relationship regarding; the behavior of a transaction partner and the benefit or cost 
associated with the relationship is needed. The positive outcome of this evaluation from 
the initial stages of a relationship will move it to the next stage the relationship 
maintenance stage (Heide, 1994).  
The positive outcome makes the exchange partners satisfied so that as partners 
continue to have repeated transactions they begin to develop trust and the degree of that 
trust gives an indication of the relationship quality (Dervitsiotis, 2006). But the 
opportunistic behavior of some buying agents leads to the suppliers not trusting the 
purchasing agents but also the firms that they represent. This goes to tarnish the image and 
the reputation of the firms. The mistrust may lead the suppliers to switch over to other 
buying firms in order to enjoy more economically and socially satisfying relationships 
(Glavee-Geo and Buvik 2012b). On the other hand, when opportunism is low this indicates 
an honest and well performing trading partner. 
Selnes and Sallis (2003) also noted that time duration is able to enforce the 
experience and also act as an essential defense in preventing the exchange partner from 
behaving opportunistically.  The prospect of opportunistic behavior is comprehensive due 
to the short prior history existing between partners at the relationship initiation stage which 
is modest as a result of established relational norms (Buvik and Burki 2010). Thus after 
repeated exchanges when satisfaction is high the prior history of the relationship will 
decrease the perceived opportunism. The history or prior relationships have negative 
influence on buyer opportunism. Cocoa growers who have been dealing with their 
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exchange partners for some time can be said to have a more satisfactory relationship with 
these partners. Prior relationships therefore lead to norm formation.  
Prior relationship reduces perceived buyer opportunism. However those 
relationships are condition on the fact that there are satisfactory relationship outcomes. A 
supplier’s prior relationship with an exchange partner reduces perceived buyer 
opportunism under conditions of moderate supplier satisfaction. Thus dissatisfied cocoa 
suppliers perceived their exchange partners as being highly opportunistic. The effect of 
relationship duration on perceived buyer opportunism increases with dissatisfactory 
relationship outcomes while satisfactory relationship outcomes reduce the perception of 
buyer opportunism.  
8.4 Implication of the study 
The theoretical implication of this study is that the study contributes to the extant 
literature on buyer supplier relationship by integrating two theories (Transaction cost 
theory and Relationship contracting theory). Relationship duration is expected to reduce 
opportunistic behavior due to establishment of relational norms according to relational 
contracting theory whilst satisfaction is also expected to reduce opportunism but the 
findings from this study shows that relationship duration is able to reduce opportunism but 
contingent on the existence of moderate satisfaction than when there is low satisfaction.  
Relative power which is more towards the license buying companies LBC’s makes 
the buying agents to behave opportunistic towards the farmers (suppliers). A managerial 
implication of this study is that managers of the buying firms would have to monitor the 
agents who represent them in dealing with the suppliers as monitoring acts as a check or 
control mechanism which leads to the reduction in the exercise of opportunism by 
exchange partners as the failure to do so goes to tarnish the image of the buying firm as 
well. Another managerial implication of this study is that it would give an understanding 
of the key factors that influence perceived buyer opportunism. In conclusion, for long-term 
business relationships to be perceived by either party as less opportunistic there is the need 
for both parties to ensure satisfactory relationship outcomes for mutual benefit. 
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8.5 Limitation of the study 
A major limitation of this study has to do with the small sample size. In this study 
the sample size is 73. This is below the recommended sample size using the formula 
proposed by Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) in Pallant (2007) which considers the number 
of independent variables involve in the study. They recommended that: N > 50+8m where 
m is the number of independent variables. Another methodological issue has to do with the 
sampling technique used. The study used convenience sampling which is not 
recommended for descriptive research. But it is permissible for pilot studies for which the 
original intention of the data collection was. A final limitation of this study is based on the 
fact that the study involved the analysis of one industry. Based on these issues, the result 
from this study may not be generalized. 
8.6 Further research 
Due to the limitation of the analysis of a single industry in this study it is 
recommended for further studies to be conducted across different industries. Also due to 
the fact that the study used cross-sectional data based on which the hypotheses were tested 
at  a single point in time it is recommended that longitudinal studies are conducted at 
different points in time to explain more on the issue of buyers’ opportunistic behavior  in 
exchange relationships. 
  Another point for further research is that since the data was collected from only the 
supplier side of the buyer-supplier dyad, the measuring of buyer opportunism is the 
supplier’s perception of buyer opportunism. It could be possible to examine buyer 
opportunism from the buyer’s perspective to see if there will be convergence. However, 
previous research has shown that such convergence in viewpoint of different parts of the 
dyad does not happen (e.g. Anderson and Narus1990; Anderson and Weitz 1989; Ganesan 
1994 cited in Joshi, 1998).  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1a Descriptive statistics (before centering of SATIS and REDURA) 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
REDURA 73 .41 3.40 1.8037 .81086 
SALESVOL 73 4.14 8.02 6.0068 .78281 
BUYCON 73 3.00 7.00 6.0525 .76066 
TRUST 73 1.43 7.00 5.5753 1.43213 
SATIS 73 2.50 7.00 5.7973 1.03949 
REPOWER 73 1.00 7.00 5.5342 1.39525 
SUDEV 73 1.50 6.75 4.5411 1.46369 
OPPORreversed 73 1.00 7.00 3.7842 1.45733 
satisCCXreduraInCC 73 -4.12 3.11 -.0553 .86058 
Valid N (listwise) 73     
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1b Descriptive statistics (with centering of SATIS and REDURA) 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SALESVOL 73 4.14 8.02 6.0068 .78281 
BUYCON 73 3.00 7.00 6.0525 .76066 
TRUST 73 1.43 7.00 5.5753 1.43213 
REPOWER 73 1.00 7.00 5.5342 1.39525 
SUDEV 73 1.50 6.75 4.5411 1.46369 
OPPORreversed 73 1.00 7.00 3.7842 1.45733 
satisCCXreduraInCC 73 -4.12 3.11 -.0553 .86058 
satisCC 73 -3.30 1.20 .0000 1.03949 
reduraln 73 -1.40 1.60 .0000 .81086 
Valid N (listwise) 73     
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APPENDIX 1c Sample characteristics statistics 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
How long have you been 
selling to this company 
(months) 
73 18.00 360.00 100.6849 85.51168 
How much in terms of 
weight were you able to sell 
to this company during the 
last crop season (Kg) 
73 62.50 3050.00 555.3082 525.25274 
What is the total size of your 
farm (Hectares) 
73 .40 7.28 2.1953 1.58179 
Valid N (listwise) 73     
 
 
APPENDIX 2a  Normality 
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APPENDIX 2b Normality 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2c  Normality 
 
 
 
 
 92 
APPENDIX 3  Reliability 
 
Scale: BUYER OPPORTUNISM (OPPOR) 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.670 4 
 
Scale: BUYER CONTROL(BUYCON) 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.837 6 
 
Scale: TRUST(TRUST) 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.946 7 
 
 
Scale: SUPPLIER SATISFACTION(SATIS) 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.896 10 
 
Scale: RELATIVE POWER(REPOWER) 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.800 2 
 
Scale: TRANSACTION-SPECIFIC SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT(SUDEV) 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.708 4 
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APPENDIX 4  Correlation matrix 
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APPENDIX 5a Without interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA
b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 50.229 7 7.176 4.542 .000
a 
Residual 102.685 65 1.580   
Total 152.914 72    
a. Predictors: (Constant), SUDEV, Salesvoln, REPOWER, BUYCON, SATIS, reduraIn, TRUST 
b. Dependent Variable: OPPORreversed 
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APPENDIX 5b with interaction 
 
 
ANOVA
b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 62.490 8 7.811 5.529 .000
a 
Residual 90.424 64 1.413   
Total 152.914 72    
a. Predictors: (Constant), satisCCXreduraInCC, Salesvoln, SUDEV, REPOWER, BUYCON, 
SATIS, reduraIn, TRUST 
b. Dependent Variable: OPPORreversed 
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APPENDIX 6  Questionnaire 
 
 
 
RESEARCH PROJECT ON SUPPLIER SATISFACTION IN BUYER-
SELLER RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE COCOA INDUSTRY OF GHANA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SURVEY ON FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE SUPPLIER SATISFACTION AND 
PERFORMANCE IN AGRO-COMMODITY VALUE CHAIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MOLDE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE 
P. O. BOX 2110 
N-6402 MOLDE, NORWAY 
 
Tlf: +47 71 21 40 00   Fax: +47 71 21 41 00 
Website: www.himolde.no 
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Dear Respondent, 
This survey on Supplier Satisfaction within the Cocoa Industry of Ghana is to find out key factors 
that influence supplier satisfaction and performance of smallholder cocoa growers of Ghana who 
are the main suppliers of cocoa beans within the Ghanaian Cocoa Value Chain. The cocoa industry 
of Ghana is a very important one in that it is a major source of foreign exchange for the economy 
and provides several direct and indirect jobs and employment opportunities to several others. 
The result of this research project will help in better understanding of the key factors that need to 
be looked at in the formulation of policies for the industry apart from the contributions it will 
make to the academic literature. Findings of this research project will be made available in the 
form of an executive summary when requested. 
Please use the given value scales where 1 represent strongly disagree up to 7 which represent 
strongly agree for responding to all questions, except questions A1 to A7 where 1 represent 
strongly agree up to 7 which represent strongly disagree. While in case of ranking your 
performance with respect to other competitive farm businesses, 1 represent worse performance 
to 7 which represent better performance. Kindly circle the value which best describe your 
answer to any particular question. These answers should best describe your perception of any 
theme that runs through the questionnaire.  The last part of the questionnaire requires filling in 
the answers to the various questions as well as ticking the answers to some questions as 
required. In some cases an interviewer will help you in responding to the various questions and 
your answers will be entered on the questionnaire. 
Information collected in this questionnaire is strictly confidential and no individual respondent 
will be identified. The responses to each question will be aggregated to aid in the final analysis of 
the information provided in this questionnaire and it is therefore not possible to trace 
information given in the survey to individual respondents.  
Thank you very much for taking the time off your busy schedules to participate in this research, 
your participation is very much appreciated. 
 
REBECCA GLAVEE-GEO  
Used with kind permission from  
RICHARD GLAVEE-GEO    
MOLDE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE 
P. O. BOX 2110 
N-6402 MOLDE, NORWAY 
Tlf: +47 71 21 40 00   Fax: +47 71 21 41 00 
Website: www.himolde.no 
Email: Richard.glavee-geo@himolde.no 
Tlf: +47 90 22 21 93 
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A: Please circle the number that represents your views regarding the following statements 
 
 
 
 
 
1. This purchasing clerk has always not 
provided me with a completely truthful 
picture of my sales transactions with 
their company 
 
2. This purchasing clerk was not always 
sincere about the correct weighing of 
my coca beans 
 
3. This buying company always breaches 
formal or informal agreements 
concerning timely payment of cash 
bonuses to their benefits 
 
4. This purchasing clerk has benefitted 
from our relationship to my detriment 
by undervaluing the weights of cocoa 
purchased from my farm. 
 
5. Sometimes this purchasing clerk lies to 
me about the quality of my cocoa 
beans in order to protect their interest 
 
6. This  purchasing clerk has sometimes 
promised to correct errors concerning 
my sales transactions without actually 
doing them latter 
 
7. Sometimes this purchasing clerk alters 
the weighing scale slightly in order to 
get what they want 
 
Strongly disagree                              Strongly 
agree 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
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B: Please circle the number that represents your views regarding the following statements. 
 
 
 
 
1. I trust this purchasing clerk that I deal 
with because he ensures that my cocoa 
sales are weighed accurately 
 
2. I trust this purchasing clerk to 
sometimes do things on my behalf 
which I can’t do myself like ensuring 
that correct entries of my sales are 
done in their books 
 
3. In our relationship this purchasing clerk 
can always be trusted at all times to be 
very truthful about my sales 
transactions with their company 
 
4. In our relationship this purchasing clerk 
has high integrity concerning my 
business dealings with them 
 
5. In our relationship this purchasing clerk 
can be counted on to do what is right 
always 
 
6. This purchasing clerk is like a friend 
because of his truthfulness 
 
 
7. This purchasing clerk cares for me 
always by his high levels of accurate 
record keeping of my sales transactions 
with their company in my passbook 
 
Strongly disagree                          Strongly agree 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
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C: Please circle the number that represents your views regarding the following statements. 
 
 
 
1. This buyer determines all aspect of 
quality assurance such as grading 
 
2. This buyer makes sure the quality of 
the cocoa I sell is ok before taking 
possession 
 
3. This buyer takes control of the product 
for quality inspection  
 
4. This buyer ensures that the quality 
testis passed 
 
5. This buyer has more control of the 
quality of cocoa I sell to their company 
 
6. This buyer always rejects poor quality 
cocoa sold to their company 
 
Strongly disagree                    Strongly agree 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 101 
D: Please circle the number that represents your views regarding the following statements 
 
 
 
1. My relationship with this buying 
company has been very beneficial for 
my farm business 
2. My relationship with this buying 
company is very attractive with respect 
to prompt payment of cash bonuses  
3. I am very pleased with my decision to 
sell to this buyer due to the financial 
benefits that is provided for my farm 
business   
4. I would recommend that other farmers 
sell their products to this buying 
company 
5. I am always very satisfied at the price at 
which I sell my cocoa to this buying 
company  
6. I have a favorable relationship with this 
buying company personnel 
7. I am satisfied with dealing with this 
buying company 
8. Would continue selling to this buying 
company always because of the good 
personal relationship I have with their 
staff 
9. This buying company is good to do 
business with 
10. I am pleased with dealing with this 
buying company always 
Strongly disagree                    Strongly agree 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 102 
E: Please circle the number that represents your views regarding the following statements 
 
1. This buying company personnel makes 
visits to help me improve on my 
performance 
2.  This buying company personnel 
frequently invites me to discuss issues 
for performance improvement with 
respect to grading of my cocoa beans 
3. This buying company recognizes my 
farm business for 
achievements/performance in the 
form of awards 
4.  This buying company provides my farm 
business with training/education 
5. This buying company provides my farm 
business with equipment or tools for 
improvement 
6. This buying company provides my farm 
business with credit/capital 
Strongly disagree                      Strongly agree 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 Much smaller                              Much bigger 
1. With respect to sales volume during the last 
twelve months, my farm business sales to 
this buying company as compared to what 
they buy from all other farmers is much 
smaller 
2. How large do you perceive cash bonuses 
paid by this buying company to your farm 
business as compared to what were paid to 
all other farmers? 
3. How large do you perceive your 
dependency on this particular buying 
company compared to other buying 
companies within this district? 
4. How much will it cost you in terms of 
transportation fare if you want to replace 
this buying company for another one in a 
new location  
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7   
 
 
1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
 
1           2            3           4            5           6          7 
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F: Please kindly complete the following statements by filing in the blank spaces or ticking where 
appropriate. 
 
1. How long have you been selling to this company?_________________________months 
 
 
2. How much in terms of weight were you able to sell to this company during the last crop 
season_________________tons_____________kg 
 
3. What is the total size of your farm________________________________ 
 
 
4. Please indicate your gender: Female_______________Male_______________ 
 
5. Tick the appropriate age range that best represent your age  
 
Below 30____________31-40____________ 41-50______________Above 50________ 
 
 
6. Are you a member of any cooperative farmers association? Yes_________No_________ 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU 
 
 
 
 
